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JURISDICTION TO TAX CORPORATIONS 
Omri Marian* 
Abstract: Corporate tax residence is fundamental to our federal income 
tax system. Whether a corporation is classified as “domestic” or “foreign” 
for U.S. federal income tax purposes determines the extent of tax juris-
diction the United States has over the corporation and its affiliates. Un-
fortunately, tax scholars seem to agree that the concept of corporate tax 
residence is “meaningless.” Underlying this perception are the ideas that 
corporations cannot have “real” residence because they are imaginary en-
tities and because taxpayers can easily manipulate corporate tax residence 
tests. Commentators try to deal with the perceived meaninglessness by ei-
ther trying to identify a normative basis to guide corporate tax residence 
determination, or by minimizing the relevance of corporate tax residence 
to the calculation of tax liabilities. This Article argues that both of these 
approaches are misguided. Instead, this Article suggests a functional ap-
proach, under which corporate tax residence models are designed to 
support the policy purposes of corporate taxation. This Article concludes 
that the U.S. should reform the way it defines “domestic” corporations for 
tax purposes by adopting a two-pronged tax residence test: the place 
where the corporation’s securities are listed for public trading, or the 
place of the corporation’s central management and control. 
Introduction 
 Corporate tax residence is a foundational legal construct. Deter-
mining a corporation’s tax residence (namely, whether the corporation 
is “foreign” or “domestic” for tax purposes) is necessary to calculate the 
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tax liabilities of the corporation and its affiliates,1 and sometimes, its 
shareholders.2 Unfortunately, tax scholars seem to agree that corporate 
tax residence is a meaningless concept.3 This Article disputes this 
common perception. This Article argues that the defining normative 
criteria commonly used to assess the “meaningfulness” of corporate tax 
residence are irrelevant. Instead, this Article suggests alternative crite-
ria that are based on functional, rather than normative, considerations. 
 There are two reasons for the perceived “meaninglessness” of cor-
porate tax residence. Some scholars argue that corporate tax residence 
lacks a convincing normative basis to justify treating a corporation as 
“domestic” in one jurisdiction rather than another.4 Alternatively, some 
scholars propose that corporate tax residence is too vulnerable to tax-
payer manipulation.5 Effectively, these scholars argue that corporate 
                                                                                                                      
 
1 This Article uses the term “affiliates” to designate corporate entities that are mem-
bers of the same control group as the corporation, but whose tax residence must be de-
termined. 
2 See Task Force on Int’l Task Reform, Am. Bar. Ass’n, Report of the Task Force on Interna-
tional Tax Reform, 59 Tax Law. 649, 746 (2006) [hereinafter Task Force on International Tax 
Reform] (stating that “the manner in which, and the extent to which, U.S. tax will be im-
posed depends on whether the particular corporation is domestic or foreign”). 
3 See infra notes 4–5 and accompanying text. 
4 See Michael J. Graetz, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture: Taxing International Income: In-
adequate Principles, Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies, 54 Tax L. Rev. 261, 320 
(2001) (commenting that “[i]n the case of corporations . . . the idea of residence . . . 
seems both outdated and unstable”); Michael S. Kirsch, Taxing Citizens in a Global Economy, 
82 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 443, 465–67 (2007) (discussing the lack of a substantive connection be-
tween corporate tax residence and the corporate economic attributes in a global econ-
omy); Edward D. Kleinbard, The Lessons of Stateless Income, 65 Tax L. Rev. 99, 159 (2011) 
(arguing that in the United States, corporate tax residence is “completely artificial”); David 
R. Tillinghast, A Matter of Definition: ‘Foreign’ and ‘Domestic’ Taxpayers, 2 Int’l Tax & Bus. 
Law. 239, 260 (1984) (describing corporate tax residence as a “crude, if not naïve, crite-
rion”); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Tax Competition and the Trend Toward Territoriality (Dec. 
18, 2012) (Univeristy of Michigan Law School Public Law Research Paper Series, Paper 
No. 297), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2191251 (ar-
guing in favor of territorial taxation because “corporate residence is not very meaning-
ful”). 
5 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Nicola Sartori & Omri Marian, Global Perspectives on 
Income Taxation Law 154 (2011) (discussing the manipulation of corporate tax resi-
dence by taxpayers); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis 
of the Welfare State, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1575, 1593–97 (2000) (discussing how corporate tax 
residence rules are manipulated by taxpayers to reduce their tax liability); Michael J. 
McIntyre, Determining the Residence of Members of a Corporate Group, 51 Can. Tax J. 1567, 1571 
(2003) (arguing that “as currently constituted, [corporate tax residence tests] are elective 
to a substantial degree”); Daniel Shaviro, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture: The Rising Tax-
Electivity of U.S. Corporate Residence, 64 Tax L. Rev. 377, 381–85 (2011) (arguing that corpo-
rate tax residence is effectively elective in the United States). There are numerous recent 
discussions in the media on tax planning schemes involving corporate tax residence ma-
nipulation. See, e.g., David Kocienieski, As Oil Industry Fights a Tax, It Reaps Subsidiaries, N.Y. 
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tax residence is elective.6 Taxpayers can arrange the tax residence of 
corporations as they see fit, and avoid taxes.7 
                                                                                                                     
 Responses to this acute problem march along two fronts.8 One 
response is a continued debate on the “best” normative justification for 
the determination of corporate tax residence.9 This approach will here-
inafter be referred to as the “normative approach.” The second re-
sponse doubts that a normative foundation for corporate tax residence 
can be found.10 Accordingly, this response suggests that we should min-
imize the importance of corporate tax residence in the calculation of 
tax liabilities. This second approach will hereinafter be referred to as 
the “pragmatic approach.” Part I of this Article suggests that both the 
normative approach and the pragmatic approach are inadequate.11 
 Under the normative approach, corporate tax residence tests are 
independently justified in normative terms. For example, a normative 
justification for a particular residence test may be that the test is more 
efficient than another. A proponent of an “efficient” tax residence 
model takes the position that a model is desirable because it possesses 
an inherently positive quality—efficiency—regardless of whether the 
reason for taxing corporations has anything to do with efficiency. 
 Under an alternative normative stance, a corporate tax residence 
test could be justified if it captures a meaningful “nexus” of the corpo-
ration to a particular jurisdiction. Because the corporation benefits 
from the public goods created by the jurisdiction, it is justified to tax 
the corporation in that jurisdiction. The debate between the two nor-
 
Times, July 3, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/04/business/04bptax.html?page 
wanted=1&_r=0; Howard Mustoe, Wolseley Follows Shire, Ineos Group in Moving Its Tax Resi-
dence From U.K., Bloomberg (Sept. 27, 2010, 3:51 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/2010-09-27/wolseley-follows-shire-ineos-group-in-moving-its-tax-residence-from-u-k-
.html; Becky Yerak et al., Aon Will Lower Tax Burden in Moving Headquarters to London, Chi. 
Trib., Jan. 14, 2012, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-01-14/business/ct-biz-0114-
aon-moving--20120114_1_aon-center-aon-ceo-aon-corp; Jason Zweig, How to Owe Capital 
Gains Taxes Without Even Trying, Wall St. J., ( Jan. 18, 2013, 5:39 PM), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB10001424127887323783704578249841775885514.html. 
6 McIntyre, supra note 5, at 1571; Shaviro, supra note 5, at 385. 
7 See infra notes 60–64 and accompanying text. 
8 See McIntyre, supra note 5, at 1570 (noting how countries can determine corporate 
residence either using a practical system of corporate taxation not dependent on resi-
dence, or defining corporate residence according to the intended purpose of corporate 
income tax); see also infra notes 140–148 and accompanying text (describing the two ap-
proaches to U.S. corporate tax residence). 
9 See infra notes 24–79 and accompanying text. 
10 See infra notes 60–79 and accompanying text. 
11 See infra notes 24–79 and accompanying text. 
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mative standards for corporate tax residence tests can be described as a 
dichotomy of formal and substantive tests.12 
 Part I, Section A argues that the normative dichotomy does not 
make sense in the context of theories that justify the taxation of corpo-
rate entities. Specifically, the polarized normative arguments are ad-
vanced under the assumption that either efficiency is a desirable goal, 
or that corporations are “real entities” capable of benefiting from pub-
lic goods. 
 Scholars agree, however, that corporate tax itself is an inefficient 
model of revenue collection,13 and that for tax purposes, corporations 
are not real beings.14 Rather, corporations are instruments for the taxa-
tion of individuals.15 Accordingly, the debate about corporate tax resi-
dence is advanced under assumptions that have been rejected in the 
context of a bigger, first-order question: Why tax corporations to begin 
with? It makes little sense to construct the jurisdictional threshold test 
of a tax regime (i.e., the question of tax residence) under assumptions 
that have been rejected for purposes of constructing the tax regime 
itself (i.e., the regime of corporate taxation). 
 Part I, Section B discusses the pragmatic approach and shows that 
the pragmatic approach does not offer a remedy to the theoretical grid-
lock described above. Pragmatists perceive the “meaninglessness” of 
corporate tax residence as a given fact, and suggest dealing with it by 
minimizing the importance of corporate tax residence altogether.16 For 
example, under the pragmatic response, the “meaninglessness” of cor-
porate tax residence supports recent suggestions to transform the U.S. 
tax system from a global system of taxation to a territorial one.17 
 Such a reform would arguably minimize the importance of corpo-
rate tax residence tests. Under a global (or “residence-based”) tax sys-
tem, domestic tax residents are taxed on their worldwide income from 
whatever source derived, but foreign tax residents are only taxed on 
                                                                                                                      
12 See infra notes 24–59 and accompanying text. 
13 See infra notes 37–38 and accompanying text. 
14 See infra notes 56–58 and accompanying text. 
15 Id. 
16 See Graetz, supra note 4, at 323 (arguing that “[t]he fragility and manipulability of 
the residence of corporations suggests to me that U.S. international tax policy, to the ex-
tent possible, should reduce the tax consequences of determinations of residence for cor-
porations”); Shaviro, supra note 5, at 415–17 (suggesting a reform of the U.S. tax system 
from a global to a territorial system as an appropriate response to corporate tax residence 
electivity); Avi-Yonah, supra note 4 (arguing in favor of a territorial tax system on the belief 
that corporate tax residence is not meaningful). 
17 See Graetz, supra note 4, at 323; Shaviro, supra note 5, at 415–17; Avi-Yonah, supra 
note 4. 
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income derived within the jurisdiction’s territory. Alternatively, under a 
territorial system, a jurisdiction may only tax income derived from 
sources within its territory, regardless of whether such income is earned 
by domestic or foreign tax residents. Tax residence determination is 
therefore acutely important in the case of a global system, and theoreti-
cally less so in the context of a territorial system.18 
 Adherents to the pragmatic approach reason that the “meaning-
lessness” of corporate tax-residence provides one justification (among 
others) to abandon our global system of taxation in favor of a territorial 
system. Specifically, these proponents suggest that in a territorial sys-
tem, residence determination will have far fewer climatic consequences 
because corporate tax residence is not a prerequisite for establishing 
taxing jurisdiction. Instead, the source of income is the deciding factor. 
 Part I, Section B argues, however, that reforming the U.S.’s tax sys-
tem from a global to a territorial system will not cause corporate tax 
residence to be “less important” in calculating tax liabilities. This is be-
cause in many instances, the “source” of income is determined by ref-
erence to the tax residence of corporate taxpayers involved in the trans-
actions that generate the income.19 Accordingly, residence remains 
relevant even in a territorial system. 
 Part II identifies alternative criteria to determine “meaningful” 
corporate tax residence.20 Specifically, Part II suggests structuring cor-
porate tax residence models as instruments to support the policy pur-
poses that underlie why jurisdictions tax corporations in the first in-
stance. As such, Part II develops a cohesive functional model to 
determine corporate tax residence. 
 Although the suggested functional tax residence argument is also a 
normative argument, it draws its vitality from the idea that corporate 
tax residence tests should support the policy purposes of corporate tax-
ation, rather than from independent normative justifications (such as 
“efficiency” or “nexus”). For example, if one accepts the idea that cor-
porate taxation is imposed as a tool to exert tax burdens on specific 
individuals (for example, the managers or shareholders of a corpora-
tion),21 then corporate tax residence tests can only be justified if they 
                                                                                                                      
 
18 See infra notes 65–79 and accompanying text (describing the argument that corpo-
rate tax residence is less relevant in territorial tax systems). 
19 See infra notes 71–75 and accompanying text. 
20 See infra notes 80–132 and accompanying text. 
21 See infra notes 89–109 (describing the theory that corporate tax was instituted as a 
proxy to tax shareholders); infra notes 118–128 and accompanying text (describing the 
1618 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 54:1613 
indeed support such a purpose. Given this policy goal, tax residence 
determination would operate to assist in the collection of corporate tax 
in a way that burdens the intended individuals. 
 Part III surveys the possible critiques to the functional model that 
this Article develops and concludes that the traditional critiques of cor-
porate tax residence do not pose serious challenges.22 Because corpo-
rate tax residence tests are functionally tested, taxpayers cannot ma-
nipulate the tax residence tests unless they sacrifice some functional 
characteristic that justified the taxation of the corporation. For exam-
ple, if the functional justification for the determination of corporate 
tax residence is the place of residence of the shareholders, then the 
shareholders will have to move in order to change the tax residence of 
the corporation. If the shareholders indeed move, then the functional 
justification for taxing the corporation is lost, and non-taxation is the 
correct result. 
 Part IV utilizes the functional approach to conclude that the U.S. 
should reform how it defines “domestic” corporations for tax pur-
poses.23 In doing so, Part IV reviews the place of incorporation (“POI”) 
test currently in place, as well as the current reform debates in respect 
thereof. Part IV shows that current reform discussions are largely driven 
by the irrelevant formal/substantive dichotomy. It is concluded that un-
der a functional approach, the U.S. should repeal the POI test, and 
adopt a test under which a corporation is a tax resident in the U.S. if: (i) 
the securities of such corporation are listed for public trading in the 
United States or (ii) the place of central management and control of 
such corporation is in the United States. 
I. The “Meaninglessness” of Corporate Tax Residence 
 This Part discusses the normative and pragmatic approaches for 
structuring corporate tax residence tests and concludes that both ap-
proaches fall short. Specifically, Section A discusses the normative de-
bate between advocates of an efficiency standard and advocates of ben-
efits theory-based standards, showing that this debate fails to adequately 
consider the policy purposes of corporate taxation. Then, Section B 
argues that, notwithstanding the shortcomings of the normative de-
bate, the pragmatic approach is not a viable solution because the 
                                                                                                                      
theory that corporate tax was instituted as a proxy to control the excessive accumulation of 
managerial power). 
22 See infra notes 133–136 and accompanying text. 
23 See infra notes 137–188 and accompanying text. 
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pragmatic solution to the meaninglessness of tax residence—namely, 
adopting a territorial system of taxation—does not significantly mini-
mize the importance of corporate tax residence. 
A. The Formal/Substantive Dichotomy of Corporate Tax  
Residence Is Irrelevant 
 Subsection 1 describes the two families of tests used by various ju-
risdictions to determine corporate tax residence. One family of tests is 
formal and justified by efficiency standards. This family is frequently 
identified with the place of incorporation (“POI”) test. The other fam-
ily of tests, which looks at the real seat (“RS”) of corporations, is sub-
stantive and justified by benefits theory-based arguments. 
 Subsections 2 and 3 of this Section show that the justifications that 
stand to differentiate the two tests do not apply in the context of the 
policies underlying corporate taxation. Specifically, when the normative 
justifications for the tests are placed in the context of the theories that 
explain the taxation of corporate entities, the tests may, in fact, operate 
to undermine such policies. 
1. The Normative Dichotomy of Corporate Tax Residence: A 
Description 
 Almost all jurisdictions that impose tax on corporate entities de-
termine the tax residence of such entities based on one of two types of 
tests or a combination thereof.24 The first type is formal and is usually 
based on the POI of the corporation. Under a POI test, a corporate 
entity is a resident for tax purposes in the jurisdiction in which it is in-
corporated. The United States has adopted the POI test.25 The second 
type is substantive and is based on the RS of the corporation. A corpo-
ration’s RS “depends on some combination of factual elements, such as 
the location of the administrative headquarters or the location of the 
firm’s center of gravity as determined by the location of the employees 
and assets.”26 The dichotomy between “formal” and “substantive” crite-
                                                                                                                      
24 Hugh J. Ault & Brian J. Arnold, Comparative Income Taxation: A Structural 
Analysis 434 (3rd ed. 2010); Mitchell A. Kane & Edward B. Rock, Corporate Taxation and 
International Charter Competition, 106 Mich. L. Rev. 1229, 1235 (2008) (noting how jurisdic-
tions can adopt either the place of incorporation (“POI”) rule or a form of the real seat 
(“RS”) rule to determine corporate residence for tax purposes). 
25 I.R.C. § 7701 (2006). 
26 Kane & Rock, supra note 24, at 1235. 
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ria is accepted in tax literature and guides the academic discourse on 
corporate tax residence.27 
 This dichotomy may be accurate as a purely descriptive matter. 
Some jurisdictions indeed adopt formal tests28 and others adopt sub-
stantive tests.29 If this dichotomy had been limited to an observation of 
reality, this Article would have had little to argue against. The problem is 
that the dichotomy also induces a normative debate about how coun-
tries should determine the residence of corporations for tax purposes. 
Commentators argue for a POI test on the grounds of efficiency, where-
as an RS test is justified on the grounds of benefits theory, specifically, 
that taxation is a means of financing public goods. These justifications 
demonstrate that the debate is truly normative. Nevertheless, it is diffi-
cult to rationalize this normative debate because it ignores the basic un-
derlying purposes of corporate taxation. 
2. POI and Efficiency Arguments 
 Justifications for POI as the preferred corporate tax residence test 
are largely based on an efficiency rationale. This is best illustrated by an 
example. 
 Assume that Corporation X (“X Corp.”) is incorporated in Juris-
diction A (“A”), but substantively operates in multiple jurisdictions 
worldwide. Further, assume that X Corp.’s headquarters is physically 
located in Jurisdiction B (“B”). B thus enjoys certain positive external-
                                                                                                                      
27 See, e.g., Ault & Arnold, supra note 24, at 434 (“Two basic approaches are used in 
establishing a personal jurisdictional connection for corporations. One is to focus on some 
formal legal connection to the jurisdiction . . . . The other is to select some economic and 
commercial connection . . . .”); Robert Couzin, Corporate Residence and Interna-
tional Taxation 22 (2002) (contrasting the POI test with more “fact intensive tests”); 
Yariv Brauner, United States, in Residence of Companies Under Tax Treaties and EC 
Law 855, 865 (Guglielmo Maisto ed., 2009) [hereinafter Residence of Companies] (con-
trasting between the POI test in the United States and other “fact-intensive residence de-
termination” tests used by other countries); Luc De Broe, Corporate Tax Residence in Civil 
Law Jurisdiction, in Residence of Companies, supra, at 95, 96 (differentiating between 
“formal and factual tests” used in civil law countries); Martin Norr, Jurisdiction to Tax and 
International Income, 17 Tax L. Rev. 431, 437 (1961) (contrasting “fiscal domicile” with 
“legal domicile”); Tillinghast, supra note 4, at 260–66 (contrasting the POI test adopted in 
the United States with tests adopted in other jurisdictions that require “factual analysis”); 
Rudolf Weber-Fas, Corporate Residence Rules for International Tax Jurisdiction: A Study of Ameri-
can and German Law, 5 Harv. J. on Legis. 175, 181 (1967) (noting that “[i]n sharp contrast 
to the simplicity of determining the seat, there are often highly complex factual issues 
involved in locating the place of management of a corporation . . . .”). 
28 The United States and Japan are examples of countries that adopt a formal test. 
29 Most Commonwealth jurisdictions adopt substantive tests that analyze the place of 
central management and control. 
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ities stemming from X Corp.’s presence in the jurisdiction—X Corp. 
employs residents of B, has management facilities therein, and so on.30 
If B determines the tax residence of corporations based on POI, then X 
Corp. is a “foreign” corporation for tax purposes because it is not incor-
porated in B. 
 Furthermore, assume that B is a residence-based (or “global”) tax 
jurisdiction. Namely, B taxes its domestic residents on their worldwide 
income, but taxes foreign residents only on income derived from within 
its territory (much like the U.S.). Because X Corp. is a foreign corpora-
tion for B’s tax purposes, X Corp. is only taxed in B on income derived 
from sources within B’s territory. All of X Corp.’s income derived from 
its worldwide operations outside B is not subject to B’s taxing jurisdic-
tion, notwithstanding that X Corp. is managed from within B. 
 If B reforms its corporate tax residence law and adopts a common 
version of the RS test, such as the central management and control test 
(“CMC”), then X Corp. would be a “domestic” corporation for tax pur-
poses. Under a CMC test, a corporation is a resident for tax purposes in 
a jurisdiction where “the central management and control actually 
abides.”31 Because X Corp.’s management is located in B, the reform 
would cause X Corp. to become a “domestic” corporation for B’s tax 
purposes. Consequently, X Corp. would be taxed in B on all of its 
worldwide income. Such a result creates an incentive for X Corp. to 
rearrange its affairs so its RS is no longer in B, which is achieved by 
moving its headquarters outside of B. If this happens, B will lose the 
benefits associated with having X Corp.’s headquarters located in B. 
 The efficiency argument in favor of the POI test is now apparent 
because unlike RS, POI does not distort taxpayers’ behavior.32 Specifi-
cally, taxpayers are relatively indifferent as to the place of legal incorpo-
ration. In contrast, taxpayers are not indifferent to real economic at-
                                                                                                                      
30 See Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Ariel Assa, U.S. Taxation of Foreign Income 116 
(2007) (describing how jurisdictions benefit from corporate headquarters). Corporate 
headquarters are highly coveted by jurisdictions because they create well-paying jobs and 
are an incubator for human capital. Id. These benefits, naturally, have the potential to spur 
additional job growth within the jurisdiction. Id. 
31 De Beers Consol. Mines, Ltd. v. Howe, [1906] A.C. 455 (H.L.) (appeal taken from 
Eng.). 
32 See, e.g., Tax Reform Options: International Issues: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 
112th Cong. 7–8 (2011) [hereinafter Tax Reform Options] (statement of Prof. James R. 
Hines, Jr., University of Michigan Law School) (arguing against the adoption of a central 
management and control test because it persuades corporations to relocate desirable 
management activities); Kane & Rock, supra note 24, at 1240–41 (discussing the possible 
tax savings that may result from shifting the “tax location” of a corporation from one juris-
diction to another). 
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tributes such as infrastructure, customer base, and the quality of the 
labor force. Indeed, as this example shows, corporate taxpayers may 
incorporate in one jurisdiction, but physically operate in another. 
 The jurisdiction where a corporation physically operates has the 
benefit of positive externalities such as direct investment, jobs, and so 
on. A reform that adopts a RS test may encourage migration to another 
jurisdiction (or non-investment to begin with) of the relevant attributes 
according to which RS is determined (in the case of this example, place 
of management). The result of such a migration (or non-investment) is 
a loss of the benefits associated with having a corporation’s headquar-
ters (or other attributes according to which RS is determined) within a 
jurisdiction.33 According to the efficiency-based normative approach, 
therefore, POI is a desirable corporate tax residence test because, un-
like RS, it does not cause taxpayers to change their behavior in an eco-
nomically significant manner. 
 Moreover, the POI test is extremely cost-effective. As compared to 
the fact-intensive inquiries necessitated by the RS test,34 POI provides 
perfect legal certainty as to corporate tax residence status.35 In this way, 
POI is very easy to administer.36 
 As currently reflected in academic debate, such efficiency-driven 
arguments in favor of the POI test are first-order, self-standing norma-
tive arguments. Because efficiency is viewed as an inherently positive 
quality, the corporate tax residence test that should be adopted is POI, 
as it is the most efficient test. 
 Such arguments, however, are advanced in complete disconnect 
from the vibrant discussions on the purposes of corporate taxation.37 
This is crucially important because one thing that legal scholars and 
public finance economists agree upon (a rare occasion indeed), is that 
                                                                                                                      
33 Tax Reform Options, supra note 32 at 7–8 (statement of James R. Hines, Jr., Professor, 
University of Michigan Law School) (stating that the central management and control test 
is not preferable from a policy perspective because it causes corporations to relocate their 
headquarters); Shaviro, supra note 5, at 413–15 (rejecting the central management and 
control test because it risks the loss of positive externalities). 
34 See infra notes 44–53 and accompanying text. 
35 See Tillinghast, supra note 4, at 259–66. 
36 See Task Force on International Tax Reform, supra note 2, at 747 (noting that “[t]he 
place of organization rule could not be clearer or easier for taxpayers to correctly exe-
cute”); Shaviro, supra note 5, at 415 (rejecting the place of shareholders residence test 
because it is difficult to administer). 
37 See infra notes 89–131 and accompanying text (discussing the possible theoretical 
justifications for imposing income tax on corporations). 
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corporate taxation, as a legal model, is absolutely inefficient.38 Corpo-
rate tax is the source of multiple behavioral distortions and is painful to 
administer. Yet, in spite of this, most jurisdictions do tax corporations. 
Although scholars fiercely debate why corporations are taxed, one 
thing is clear: it is not because corporate tax is an efficient model of 
revenue raising.39 Corporate taxation must serve purposes other than 
efficiency. 
 Given this conclusion, it seems strange to advance a corporate tax 
residence definition based on efficiency arguments. If corporate tax is 
necessary, despite its inefficiency, why should the very basic qualifica-
tion for the tax imposition be efficiency? If one’s ideological aim is to 
advance efficiency, one could argue for the abolishment of corporate 
taxation altogether (and many do).40 This is a perfectly valid and co-
herent argument. But adopting tax residence models simply because 
they are efficient, thereby disregarding the purposes of corporate taxa-
tion, could undermine such purposes. For instance, if one accepts that 
the purpose of corporate taxation is to impose tax burdens on corpo-
rate shareholders,41 then it makes little sense to adopt the POI test, 
even though it is an efficient model of tax residence. The following ex-
ample illustrates this contention. 
 Assume that Jurisdiction C (“C”) does not impose corporate in-
come tax, but does impose income tax on individuals. To avoid individ-
ual income taxes, residents of C regularly operate their businesses 
                                                                                                                      
38 See, e.g., Tax Reform Options, supra note 32, at 11 (statement of Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, 
Professor University of Michigan Law School); Jane G. Gravelle, The Economic Effects 
of Taxing Capital Income 75–90 (1994); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Corporations, Society, and 
the State: A Defense of the Corporate Tax, 90 Va. L. Rev. 1193, 1197–98 (2004) (describing the 
complications and transaction costs associated with corporate income tax, and its tendency 
to drive business owners away from their preferred form of organization); Yariv Brauner, 
The Non-Sense Tax: A Reply to New Corporate Income Tax Advocacy, 2008 Mich. St. L. Rev. 591, 
592 (arguing that corporate income tax is “socially very costly and wasteful”); Roger H. 
Gordon & Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason, Tax Distortions to the Choice of Organizational Form, 55 J. 
of Pub. Econs. 279, 304 (1994) (concluding that corporate tax treatment incentivizes 
corporations to become noncorporate and be owned by investors in extremely high per-
sonal tax brackets); Richard M. Bird, Why Tax Corporations? 1 (Technical Comm. on Bus. 
Tax., Working Paper No. 96-2, 1996) (describing the consensus among economists regard-
ing the distortions created by corporate income tax). 
39 See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
40 See generally U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Integration of the Individual and Corpo-
rate Tax Systems (1992), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Docu- 
ments/Integration.pdf (providing a summary of the arguments for eliminating corporate 
taxation). 
41 See infra notes 168–177 and accompanying text (discussing that some corporate tax 
scholars adopt a position that corporate taxation serves as a proxy to tax a corporation’s 
shareholders). 
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through closely held corporations. Instead of distributing the profits 
earned by their corporations—which would result in the imposition of 
individual income tax—C’s residents retain their profits at the corpo-
rate level, where they remain untaxed. 
 C’s policymakers are troubled by the loss of revenue resulting from 
corporate profit retention. In response, C’s legislators enact a new law 
that taxes domestic corporations as a means of taxing the corporations’ 
retained profits. In a sense, such a tax operates as a proxy to the taxa-
tion of C’s residents, who hold equity in those domestic corporations.42 
Which corporate tax residence test should C adopt to achieve this goal? 
 If C adopted the POI test, the result would be efficient in the sense 
that no meaningful behavioral distortions would result. The new cor-
porate tax would be unlikely to cause C’s residents to change their be-
havior in any economically meaningful way. All that C’s residents would 
have to do in order to keep avoiding the tax would be to accumulate 
their profits in corporations incorporated abroad, rather than in C. In-
corporating abroad, in a low (or no) tax jurisdiction, is often an inex-
pensive practice that is merely a phone call away.43 
 This result makes C’s corporate tax-residence test meaningless, 
specifically because it is based on the normative justification of effi-
ciency, and particularly because efficiency is achieved. By adopting the 
most efficient model, C avoided behavioral distortions, but completely 
defeated the purposes for which C enacted corporate tax in the first 
place. C’s residents can still avoid tax on retained profits. 
 To summarize, supporters of POI as the preferred model of cor-
porate tax residence base their arguments on efficiency as a desirable 
normative value. This makes little sense in the context of corporate 
taxation because corporate taxes are apparently designed to achieve 
                                                                                                                      
42 Some scholars argue that corporations are taxed in the United States for the very 
purpose of taxing the corporation’s equity holders. See Steven A. Bank, Entity Theory as 
Myth in the US Corporate Excise Tax of 1909, in 2 Studies in the History of Tax Law 393, 
394 (John Tiley ed., 2007) [hereinafter Bank, US Corporate Excise Tax of 1909]; Steven A. 
Bank, Entity Theory as Myth in the Origins of the Corporate Income Tax, 43 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 
447, 452 (2001) [hereinafter Bank, Entity Theory as Myth]; Steven A. Bank, The Dividend 
Divide in Anglo-American Corporate Taxation, 30 J. Corp. L. 1, 15–18 (2004) [hereinafter 
Bank, The Dividend Divide]. But cf. Avi-Yonah, supra note 38, at 1244–49 (arguing that in the 
United States corporate taxation functions primarily as a regulatory device on managers); 
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Why Was the US Corporate Tax Enacted in 1909?, in 2 Studies in the 
History of Tax Law 377, 387–92 (John Tiley ed., 2007). 
43 We Set Up an Offshore Company in a Tax Haven, NPR, ( July 27, 2012, 6:04 PM) http://www. 
npr.org/blogs/money/2012/07/27/157499893/episode-390-we-set-up-an-offshore-company-
in-a-tax-haven (illustrating the ease in which one could set up offshore companies by describ-
ing how simple it was for NPR staff to call to set up wholly owned corporations in tax havens). 
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purposes other than efficiency. As this Section has shown, determin-
ing corporate tax residence on efficiency considerations may operate 
against the policy purposes of corporate taxes. 
3. RS and the Benefits Theory 
 The normative justifications for the RS test, like the normative jus-
tifications for the POI test, also operate against the policy purposes of 
corporate tax laws. Normative justifications for an RS test are difficult 
to distill, primarily because there are multiple subcategories of RS tests 
adopted by different jurisdictions.44 All Commonwealth jurisdictions 
adhere, among other tests, to the CMC test discussed above.45 Civil law 
countries look into multiple factors such as the place of effective man-
agement (“POEM”) which is similar (and sometimes even viewed as 
identical) to CMC;46 the “legal seat,” which is indicated in registration 
documents or in the articles of association;47 the place where the main 
                                                                                                                      
44 Most jurisdictions that apply the RS test regard POI as a relevant factor in determin-
ing corporate tax residence. But unlike jurisdictions applying the POI test, foreign incor-
poration does not necessarily mean that a corporation is indeed “foreign.” See infra note 47 
and accompanying text. 
45 See Couzin, supra note 27, at 55–58 (discussing the adoption of the management 
and control tests by Commonwealth jurisdictions); see also Ault & Arnold, supra note 24, 
at 435 (noting that Commonwealth countries traditionally adhere to the central manage-
ment and control test to determine corporate tax-residence). 
46 In most cases, POEM is the same as CMC. See HM Revenue & Customs, INTM 
120210—Company Residence: Guidance Originally Published in the International 
Tax Handbook, § ITH348 (2010), available at http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/int 
manual/intm120210.htm#IDA1ORZF (explaining the apparent differences between CMC 
and POEM and concluding that “it is not that easy to divorce effective management from 
central management and control and in the vast majority of cases they will be located in 
the same place”). The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(“OECD”) also adheres to the POEM, which it defines as “the place where key manage-
ment and commercial decisions that are necessary for the conduct of the entity’s business 
as a whole are in substance made.” See OECD Comm. on Fiscal Affairs, Model Tax Con-
vention on Income and on Capital, C-(4)8 (2010), available at http://www.keepeek. 
com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/taxation/model-tax-convention-on-income-and-on-
capital-2010_9789264175181-en. 
47 See, e.g., Tax Mgmt. (BNA) Portfolio 984-5th: Business Operations in Spain, pt. V, § A, 
at 2 (describing Spain, where one of the qualifying criteria for corporate tax residence is 
the place of “registered office”); Tax Mgmt. (BNA) Portfolio 985-4th: Business Operations in 
Sweden, pt. V, § A (describing Sweden, where a company “registered with the Swedish 
Companies Registration Office” is deemed a resident for tax purposes); Tax Mgmt. (BNA) 
Portfolio, 962-3rd, Business Operations in Germany, pt. V, § A, at 2 (describing Germany, 
where a corporation is a tax resident if, among other criteria, its statutory seat is in Ger-
many). 
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economic activity of the corporation is carried on;48 and the place of 
residence of shareholders.49 
 Notwithstanding the multiplicity of factors considered, justifica-
tions for different RS tests share a common theme: they all inquire into 
the factual connecting factors “between a company and the national 
territory of the State who wants to exercise its jurisdiction to tax that 
company . . . .”50 This exercise is necessary, according to proponents of 
RS tests, because tax residence “requires a strong nexus with a coun-
try.”51 Under this line of substantive inquires, tax residence only arises 
where “there is some level of personal or locative connection that war-
rants, indeed, demands a high level of contribution to the public fi-
nances.”52 
 These types of arguments are a succinct summary of benefits theo-
ries according to which taxation is justified as a means for financing 
public goods.53 Implicit in this theory is that corporations, like indi-
viduals, benefit from government-created public goods, which in turn 
makes it fair for corporations to pay for those goods. Thus, determin-
ing the jurisdiction where the corporation enjoys public goods— al-
though a fact-intensive test—is relevant. 
 The underlying assumptions in nexus-related arguments are that 
the corporation is the true beneficiary of government-created public 
goods, and that the corporate entity is a truly separate being from the 
individuals involved with it. Indeed, courts and scholars have occasion-
ally analogized corporations to humans for purposes of making tax res-
                                                                                                                      
48 See, e.g., Carlo Galli, Int’l Bureau of Fiscal Documentation, Corporate Tax-
ation—Italy 26 (2013). In Italy, a corporation will be considered “domestic” for tax pur-
poses if, among satisfaction of other criteria, it’s main business purpose is in Italy for the 
greater part of the financial year. Id. 
49 Countries using some variation of the residence-of-shareholders test include, for ex-
ample, Australia and Italy. See infra notes 108–109 and accompanying text; see also De Broe, 
supra note 27, at 95–99 (providing a summary of the different factual tests adopted by civil 
law jurisdictions). 
50 See Peter Behrens, General Principles of Residence of Companies, in Residence of Com-
panies, supra note 27, at 3, 26–27; see also Pasquale Pistone, EC Law and Tax Residence of 
Companies, in Residence of Companies, supra note 27, at 183, 184–85. 
51 De Broe, supra note 27, at 95 (emphasis added). 
52 Couzin, supra note 27, at 2. 
53 See J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Fairness in International 
Taxation: The Ability-to-Pay Case for Taxing Worldwide Income, 5 Fla. Tax Rev. 299, 333–39 
(2001) (providing a summary and critique of benefits analysis in the international con-
text); Jeffrey A. Schoenblum, Tax Fairness or Unfairness? A Consideration of the Philosophical 
Bases for Unequal Taxation of Individuals, 12 Am. J. Tax Pol’y 221, 225–33 (1995) (providing 
a summary and critique of benefits analysis). 
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idence arguments.54 One commentator has even concluded that for tax 
purposes, a corporation, like a human, “resides in the place where it 
has the closest economic, political, cultural and legal links.”55 
 Contemporary corporate tax theorists, however, generally agree 
that the “real-entity” view of corporations has little (if any) value in ex-
plaining why and how countries tax corporations.56 Instead, it is gener-
ally understood that corporate taxes are an instrument to get into the 
pockets of, or affect the behavior of, certain individuals.57 In addition, 
public finance empiricists seem to unanimously agree that “people, not 
corporations, pay taxes.”58 In short, the contemporary view is that taxes 
                                                                                                                      
54 See, e.g., Cesena Sulphur Co. v. Nicholson, [1876] 1 Exch. Div. 28 (App. Cas.) at 452 
(Eng.); Matthew Collett, Developing a New Test of Fiscal Residence for Companies, 26 U. New S. 
Wales L.J. 622, 628 (2003). The court in Cesena Sulphur explained: 
The use of the word “residence” is founded upon the habits of a natural man, 
and is therefore inapplicable to the artificial and legal person whom we call a 
corporation. But for the purpose of giving effect to the words of the legisla-
ture an artificial residence must be assigned to this artificial person, and one 
formed on the analogy of natural persons. 
Cesena Sulphur, 1 Exch. Div. 28 at 452; see also Collett, supra, at 628 (arguing that compa-
nies, like individuals, “have features which link them to particular jurisdictions,” and that 
companies, like individuals, “consume public goods, benefit from the use of public infra-
structure and have impacts on the environment . . . .”). 
55 Collett, supra note 54, at 623; see also Couzin, supra note 27, at 5 (arguing that cor-
porate taxation theoretically requires the recognition of corporate personality and that 
nexus-based tests should therefore be formulated to tax corporations). 
56 Avi-Yonah, supra note 38, at 1209 (explaining why a real-entity view of corporate tax 
is “unpersuasive”); Bank, Entity Theory as Myth, supra note 42, at 466–67 (describing the 
traditional entity theory as “historically inaccurate”). 
57 See supra note 42 and accompanying text (proposing that corporate taxation is best 
understood as a proxy to tax shareholders). Despite the fierce debate in corporate tax 
literature, it is generally agreed that individuals, not entities, carry the burden of corporate 
taxes. See infra note 58 (describing the literature that summarizes the debate about corpo-
rate tax incidence). 
58 Jack Mintz, The Corporation Tax: A Survey, Fiscal Studies, Nov. 1995, at 23, 23; see al-
so Does the Tax System Support Economic Efficiency, Job Creation, and Broad-Based Economic 
Growth?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 112th Cong. 82 (2011) (statement of Prof. Mi-
chael J. Graetz, Columbia Law School) (quoting Paul H. O’Neill while stating that “corpo-
rations don’t pay taxes, they collect them”). There is an ongoing controversy regarding 
exactly which individuals bear the corporate tax burden. Generally, “corporate tax could 
be borne by some combination of the shareholders of corporations, investors in all capital 
through a decrease in the overall return to capital, workers through a decrease in wages, 
and customers through increased output prices.” William M. Gentry, A Review of the Evi-
dence on the Incidence of the Corporate Income Tax 3 (Dep’t of the Treasury, Working Paper No. 
101, 2007); see Alan. J. Auerbach, Who Bears the Corporate Tax Burden: A Review of What We 
Know, 20 Tax Pol’y and Econ. 1, 1 (2006); Jennifer C. Gravelle, Corporate Tax Incidence: A 
Review of Empirical Estimates and Analysis 29 (Congr. Budget Office, Working Paper No. 
2011-01, 2011). 
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imposed on corporations are eventually borne by real people, not by 
some imaginary entity. 
 If that is indeed the case, the attempt to analogize corporations to 
humans for purposes of tax residence determination is problematic. If 
the purpose of corporate taxation is to tax individuals, corporate tax 
residence tests (and any other corporate tax provision, for that matter) 
should be designed to ensure that the corporate tax is eventually trans-
lated into burdening the intended individuals. The “economic, politi-
cal, cultural and legal links”59 of the corporation are irrelevant. The 
relevant links are those of the individuals we seek to burden by way of 
taxing corporations in which such individuals hold interests. 
 To summarize, the dichotomy supporting current discussion on 
corporate tax residence determination seems tenuous. On one end of 
the spectrum, supporters of the POI test advance arguments about effi-
ciency. Such arguments make little sense because efficiency does not 
support the very taxation of corporate entities in the first place. On the 
other side of the spectrum, RS supporters advance benefits theory-
based arguments, which take a real-entity view of the corporation. The 
real-entity view of the corporation, however, has been unanimously re-
jected by corporate tax scholars. The bottom line is that the jurisdic-
tional entry test to the corporate tax regime is supported by normative 
assumptions, which have been rejected in the context of justifying the 
corporate tax regime itself. 
B. The Importance of Corporate Tax Residence Determination  
Cannot Be Minimized 
 This Section discusses the pragmatic approach to the perceived 
“meaningless” of corporate tax residence. The pragmatic approach 
suggests that adopting a territorial system of taxation would minimize 
the importance of residence determination for purposes of calculating 
tax liabilities, thus circumventing the meaninglessness of corporate tax 
residence. This Section shows, however, that despite its intention, the 
pragmatic approach does not avoid the meaninglessness of corporate 
tax residence. 
1. The Pragmatic Approach: A Description 
 The failure to identify convincing normative bases for corporate 
tax residence leads some scholars to suggest that we should abandon 
                                                                                                                      
59 See Couzin, supra note 27, at 5; Collett, supra note 54, at 630. 
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the discussion altogether, or, at the very least, make tax residence un-
important for purposes of calculating tax outcomes.60 This pragmatic 
approach takes the position that there is little sense in pursuing a nor-
mative justification for the tax residence of entities that are not them-
selves an intended target of tax policy.61 
 Even if some normative justification can be found, pragmatists ar-
gue that corporate tax residence cannot properly function as a legal 
construct because sophisticated taxpayers (and even not-so-sophisticated 
taxpayers) can easily manipulate corporate tax residence.62 For exam-
ple, POI residence tests can easily be avoided by incorporating in a for-
eign jurisdiction. Likewise, RS tests that consider the place of effective 
management of the corporation, such as CMC or POEM, can be avoided 
by ensuring that all important board meetings are conducted in a for-
eign country (which is commonly understood by tax practitioners to be 
the reason why airport hotels were invented).63 The main thrust of the 
pragmatic argument is that any corporate tax residence test will be 
meaningless because it is elective, and thus subject to the whims of tax-
payers.64 
 Pragmatists suggest that adopting territorial tax jurisdictions would 
solve the meaninglessness of corporate tax residence.65 Adopting terri-
torial tax jurisdiction arguably makes corporate tax residence irrelevant 
for purposes of calculating tax liabilities––thereby circumventing the 
                                                                                                                      
60 See McIntyre, supra note 5, at 1571; Shaviro, supra note 5, at 385. 
61 Shaviro, supra note 5, at 395 (noting that “[a]fter all, corporations are not sentient be-
ings, and cannot feel benefits or burdens. Thus, they are not directly of normative interest.”). 
62 See supra note 5 and accompanying text (proposing that U.S. corporate tax resi-
dence is essentially elective). 
63 Until recently, board meetings were seen as the decisive factor for purposes of deter-
mining the place of management, as expressed in the previous version of the OECD tax-
treaty model. See OECD Comm. on Fiscal Affairs, Model Tax Convention on Income 
and on Capital 81 (2005) (proposing that “[t]he place of effective management will ordi-
narily be the place where the most senior person or group of persons (for example a board 
of directors) makes its decisions, the place where the actions to be taken by the entity as a 
whole are determined”). In July 2008, however, the OECD neglected the “place of board 
meeting” presumption and adopted a much more nuanced (and less clear) test to determine 
the place of management: simply “facts and circumstances.” See OECD Comm. on Fiscal 
Affairs, Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital 77 (2008) (stating that “[a]ll 
relevant facts and circumstances must be examined to determine the place of effective man-
agement”). 
64 See McIntyre, supra note 5, at 1571; Shaviro, supra note 5, at 385. 
65 See infra notes 140–141 and accompanying text (discussing territorial tax jurisdic-
tions within the context of U.S. tax reform). 
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issue of “meaninglessness” of corporate tax residence.66 To be fair, pro-
ponents of a territorial system of taxation suggest multiple justifications 
to support territoriality. This Article argues, however, that the “mean-
inglessness” of corporate tax residence is not a convincing argument in 
this regard. 
 To understand how territorial taxation might theoretically avoid 
the meaninglessness of corporate residence, it is necessary to further 
refine the difference between global and territorial jurisdictions. Glob-
al tax jurisdictions (such as the U.S.) tax their domestic residents on 
their worldwide income from whatever source derived. Global tax ju-
risdictions, however, tax foreign corporations’ income only to the extent 
that such income is derived from sources within such jurisdictions. 
Thus, corporate taxpayers have a great incentive to avoid being classi-
fied as “domestic residents” in global jurisdictions. Alternatively, territo-
rial jurisdictions (such as most member states of the EU) tax only the 
profits derived within their territory, regardless of the foreign or do-
mestic status of the corporate taxpayer. In such jurisdictions, the rele-
vant issue for purposes of constituting taxing jurisdiction is not the res-
idence of the taxpayer, but rather the geographical source of the 
taxable income.67 
 Hence, pragmatic commentators suggest that the solution to the 
meaninglessness of corporate tax residence is to adopt a territorial tax 
system.68 By doing so, corporate tax residence is arguably irrelevant for 
purposes of calculating tax liabilities, and the issue of “meaningless-
ness” of corporate tax residence is avoided.69 
2. Corporate Tax Residence Is Always Relevant 
 This Article argues that the course of action suggested by pragma-
tists fails to address the problem of tax residence’s “meaninglessness” 
for two reasons. First, the concept of source is just as meaningless as the 
concept of residence. Second, residence remains important even in 
territorial jurisdictions. 
                                                                                                                      
66 See infra notes 141–143 and accompanying text (rejecting the argument that chang-
ing from a global to a territorial system minimizes the importance of corporate tax resi-
dence). 
67 See Ault & Arnold, supra note 24, at 495–523 (providing a description of the prin-
cipals of source-based taxation). 
68 See infra notes 140–141 and accompanying text. 
69 See infra notes 134–135 and accompanying text. 
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a. “Source” of Income in Territorial Systems Is Just As Meaningless As  
“Corporate Residence” in Global Systems 
 Assuming that what we care about is the “meaninglessness” of legal 
constructs, replacing the jurisdictional concept of “residence” with that 
of “source” is not a good solution. As multiple commentators have ar-
gued, the concept of source is just as meaningless as the concept of res-
idence.70 There is no unifying normative concept that justifies treating 
income as derived in one jurisdiction rather than another. For exam-
ple, assume that a German distributor of a motion picture pays royalties 
to the U.S. studio that produced the film. What is the source of the roy-
alty income? Is it Germany, where the film is screened and tickets are 
purchased? Is it the United States, where the film has been produced? 
What if all of the marketing activity for the screenings in Europe is 
handled by the studio’s marketing department, located in Ireland? 
What if the protected content is owned by the studio’s subsidiary, lo-
cated in Bermuda? Just as there is no “real” physical residence for cor-
porations, there is no “real” location where income is produced. With 
regards to “meaninglessness,” all that a territorial system can theoreti-
cally achieve is the replacement of one meaningless legal concept with 
another. 
b. Residence Is Still an Important Concept in Territorial Systems 
 The second argument against adopting a territorial system—that a 
territorial system does not avoid the meaninglessness of residence—is 
more important to address for purposes of this Article. Corporate tax 
residence is no less relevant for calculating tax liabilities in territorial 
jurisdictions than it is in global jurisdictions because, in many impor-
tant instances, the source of income is determined by reference to the 
residence of corporate taxpayers. 
                                                                                                                      
70 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, International Tax as International Law: An Analy-
sis of the International Tax Regime 27 (2007) (“[T]he source of income is difficult to 
define. In fact, many public finance economists would claim that the concept lacks mean-
ing in the majority of cases.”); Michael P. Devereux, Taxation of Outbound Direct Investment: 
Economic Principles and Tax Policy Considerations, 24 Oxford Rev. Econ. Pol’y 698, 712–13 
(2008) (discussing the difficulties in identifying the geographical source of income); 
Kleinbard, supra note 4, at 149 (noting that “[m]ore fundamentally, many scholars have 
concluded that the concept of ‘source’ ultimately is meaningless when applied to a wide 
range of group activities, particularly when one takes into account the theory of the firm, 
which emphasizes that multinational firms exist to capture unique groupwide synergies”); 
Lawrence Lokken, What Is This Thing Called Source, Int’l Tax J., May–June 2011, at 25, 25–
26 (discussing the lack of general consensus of source rules, and suggesting unifying the 
criteria based on the type of income). 
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 For example, assume that interest is received by Corporation M 
(“M Corp.”), resident in Jurisdiction A, from its wholly owned subsidi-
ary, Corporation N (“N Corp.”), resident in Jurisdiction B. Assume fur-
ther that Jurisdiction A is a territorial jurisdiction. In such a case, the 
interest received by M Corp. will be taxed to M Corp. in Jurisdiction A 
only to the extent the interest is sourced within Jurisdiction A. 
 Nevertheless, nearly all jurisdictions in the world determine the 
source of interest income by reference to the residence of the payor.71 
Because the payor in our example—N Corp.—is a corporation that is a 
foreign resident for tax purposes, the interest will be considered foreign-
sourced from the point of view of Jurisdiction A, and will not be taxed 
in Jurisdiction A. Whether the interest is taxed in Jurisdiction A is de-
pendent on the corporate tax residence determination of N Corp. 
 Similar source rules apply in almost all industrialized jurisdictions 
with respect to dividend payments (source is at the residence of the dis-
tributing corporation),72 and the gains from the sale of capital assets, 
particularly, the stock of a corporation (source is at the residence of the 
seller).73 
 The determination of corporate tax residence is also critically im-
portant in territorial jurisdictions in the context of income shifting.74 
Income shifting is any tax planning strategy aimed at manipulating the 
jurisdiction in which income is reported, generally by manipulating the 
source of income. For instance, corporations that are members of the 
same control group and hold different residence status for tax pur-
                                                                                                                      
71 See Yariv Brauner, An International Tax Regime in Crystallization, 56 Tax L. Rev. 259, 
281 (2002) (“The basic rule sources the interest income to the country of the payor . . . . 
Most countries consider the residence of the payor as the country of source.”). 
72 Id. (”A powerful consensus also exists with respect to the source rules for dividends. 
They are sourced at the country of the dividends’ payor, which allows the source country 
to get the ‘first bite’ of taxation.”). In the United States, an exception applies where more 
than twenty-five percent of the gross income of a foreign corporation is effectively con-
nected with a U.S. trade or business. See I.R.C. § 861 (2006). 
73 Ault & Arnold, supra note 24, at 539 (stating that “most countries generally accept 
the international treaty norm that capital gains on shares are taxable only in the residence 
country of the shareholder”). 
74 Income shifting techniques involve the shifting of reported income from one juris-
diction to another, without shifting the economic attributes associated with the production 
of the income. If successful, then the income that is produced in developed markets (usu-
ally high-tax jurisdictions, which host the economic attributes of the production, such as 
the costumer-base), is reported in tax-havens, where the only thing present is a certificate 
of incorporation. See generally OECD, Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Sharing 
(2013), http://www.oecd.org/ctp/BEPSActionPlan.pdf (providing recent analysis of tax-
base erosion resulting from income shifting techniques). 
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poses can easily manipulate the source of income by using certain types 
of intragroup payments.75 
 To illustrate, reconsider M Corp. (tax resident in Jurisdiction A) 
and N Corp., its subsidiary (tax resident in Jurisdiction B). If M Corp. is 
just a holding company, and all of the money-earning activity happens 
in N Corp., how can the profits reach M Corp.? N Corp. can simply dis-
tribute a dividend to M Corp., in which case the source of the income 
will be Jurisdiction B, because dividends are sourced to the residence of 
the payor. Alternatively, M Corp. can sell the stock of N Corp., in which 
case the income (which is attributable to the same economic activity by 
N Corp.) will be sourced to Jurisdiction A, because the source rule for 
income from the sale of capital assets (N Corp.’s stock) is the residence 
of the seller. 
 More complex income shifting strategies that involve intercom-
pany sales debt and royalties are the bread and butter of many interna-
tional tax practitioners. Importantly for our purposes, these schemes 
only work because some of the corporations involved in such strategies 
are foreign, while others are domestic. Accordingly, corporate tax resi-
dence determination remains very important even in sourced-based 
jurisdictions. Corporate tax residence issues are not avoided simply by 
adopting a territorial system of taxation. 
c. Common Responses to Income Shifting Do Not Minimize the 
Importance of Residence 
 The solutions to the widely acknowledged problem of income 
shifting come in several forms, but they do not alleviate the need to 
determine the tax residence of the corporations involved. One type of 
solution to income shifting is to enact specific anti-abuse rules address-
ing specific types of income shifting transactions.76 Such anti-abuse 
                                                                                                                      
75 See Edward D. Kleinbard, Stateless Income, 11 Fla. Tax. Rev. 699, 703 (2011) (“State-
less income is an inevitable by-product of fundamental international income tax norms, 
like the recognition of the separate tax personas of different juridical persons, even when 
they are commonly owned . . . .”). 
76 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 163(j), 482, 7701(1). The Internal Revenue Code and Department 
of the Treasury regulations contain multiple specific provisions to combat income shifting. 
For example, Section 482 of the Code and the regulations promulgated thereunder allow 
the IRS to target transactions between members of the same control group and reallocate 
income and deductions among the members if such transactions are structured to avoid 
taxes. Id. § 482. Section 163(j) of the Code and the regulations promulgated thereunder 
disallow interest deductions in certain cases of financing transactions between related par-
ties. Id. § 163(j). Section 7701(l) and the regulations promulgated thereunder disregard 
certain entities in certain intragroup financing transactions. Id. § 7701(1). 
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rules target income that is shifted from “domestic” to “foreign” corpo-
rations in a manner that is perceived as abusive. Clearly, tax residence 
remains very relevant; the existence of “domestic” and “foreign” corpo-
rate taxpayers is sine qua non in the facilitation of such transactions. 
 A second solution to income shifting—widely adopted by most in-
dustrialized jurisdictions—is known as the “controlled foreign corpora-
tion” (“CFC”) regime.77 Under a CFC regime, domestic shareholders of 
a foreign corporation are taxed on income earned by such foreign cor-
poration.78 This tax applies regardless of whether the corporate earn-
ings are distributed to the shareholders. Under a successful CFC re-
gime, shareholders will have a hard time avoiding current taxation by 
accumulating profits in “foreign” corporations. But, all CFC regimes 
require—by definition—the determination that the “controlled foreign 
corporation” is “foreign.” Hence, tax residence of corporate entities 
still plays an important role. 
 The third type of solution to income shifting is to simply try and 
define the tax residence of corporations in a “meaningful” way. When 
corporate tax residence is determined by using “substantive” considera-
tions, it should prove difficult to set up a corporation that will be re-
spected as “foreign” for tax purposes, thereby facilitating intragroup 
income shifting. For this reason, most territorial jurisdictions in the 
world have very well-developed RS tests for corporate tax residence.79 
The experience of territorial jurisdictions shows that the importance of 
tax residence in territorial jurisdictions is an actual issue faced by tax 
policymakers in territorial systems; it is not merely theoretical. 
 To summarize, in territorial jurisdictions the question of meaning-
lessness of corporate tax residence does not go away. One cannot min-
                                                                                                                      
77 See Brian J. Arnold, The Taxation of Controlled Foreign Corporations: An 
International Comparison 70–73 (1986) (describing the CFC regimes in various juris-
dictions); Ault & Arnold, supra note 24, at 477 (noting that of nine countries surveyed, 
the Netherlands was the only nation that did not have a CFC regime in place). In the 
United States, the CFC regime is incorporated into what is commonly referred to as “Sub-
part F” of the internal Revenue Code. See I.R.C. §§ 951–965 (2006). 
78 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 951–952, 954. In the U.S. tax scheme, Section 951 requires that 
“United States Shareholders” in “Controlled Foreign Corporation[s]” include as income 
all “Subpart F” income earned by the controlled foreign corporation, regardless of wheth-
er income is distributed to shareholders. Id. § 951. Subpart F income is generally income 
of passive nature (such as interests, dividends, and royalties) that can rather easily be shift-
ed among members of the same control group. See id. §§ 952, 954. 
79 For example, most member countries of the European Union have a territorial, or 
territorial-like, system to tax corporations. Despite this, scholars still analyze corporate tax 
residence issues in the European Union. See generally Residence of Companies, supra note 
27 (discussing the various corporate tax residence issues within the European Union 
member states). 
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imize the importance of corporate tax residence in calculating tax li-
abilities simply by adopting a territorial system of taxation. 
II. Developing a Purpose-Driven Model of Corporate  
Tax Residence 
 Part I demonstrated that the normative debate on corporate tax 
residence does not provide useful guidance for the formulation of cor-
porate tax residence models. Additionally, it showed that making tax 
residence “less relevant” through a pragmatic approach is not a viable 
solution either. Part I concluded that the “meaninglessness” of corpo-
rate tax residence exists because the current debate is largely disen-
gaged from the purposes for which jurisdictions tax corporations. 
 This Part suggests that a proper remedy must force an engagement 
between corporate tax residence models and the policy purposes that 
justify the taxation of corporate entities. Accordingly, corporate tax res-
idence discussion should be functional. The idea is to design corporate 
tax residence models that support the basic founding policies of corpo-
rate tax laws. Part II describes this idea in what this Article terms as the 
“functional approach.” 
 Section A of this Part discusses the functional approach to corpo-
rate tax residence generally. Then, Section B describes the necessary 
assumptions on which such an approach relies. Lastly, Section C dis-
cusses how the functional approach operates. 
A. The Functional Approach As the Solution to the Meaninglessness of 
Corporate Tax Residence 
 Elements of the functional approach have already been raised by 
other scholars. Yet no scholars have done so in an attempt to create a 
new coherent approach for corporate tax residence, as this Article 
does. For example, Michael McIntyre suggests that the remedy for tax-
payers’ de facto electivity of corporate tax residence is “to define corpo-
rate residence in terms of the function that residence taxation is in-
tended to serve in a corporate income tax.”80 McIntyre assumes that 
“corporate tax is a tax on the income that shareholders have derived 
through their ownership interests in corporations,”81 and explains his 
functional idea as follows: “To be successful in imposing and collecting 
a residence tax on corporations, a country must define ‘residence’ in a 
                                                                                                                      
80 McIntyre, supra note 5, at 1570. 
81 Id. at 1571. 
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way that is not easily avoided.”82 He contends that “[a] legal standard 
for defining residence would focus on meaningful links that a corpora-
tion could not surrender without significant dislocations.”83 
 Although McIntyre’s idea is stated as functional, it is not truly func-
tional in the sense that this Article refers to it, for three important rea-
sons. First, McIntyre assumes that there is a single purpose for corpo-
rate taxation—the taxation of shareholders. Such an assumption is 
problematic because corporate tax theorists have suggested multiple 
purposes to be served by corporate taxation beyond the taxation of 
shareholders.84 
 Second, it is not clear how McIntyre’s purpose of “taxing share-
holders” translates into “meaningful links” of the corporation to the ju-
risdiction. If the purpose is to tax shareholders, why not have a corpo-
rate residence test that is dependent on the “meaningful links” of the 
shareholders to the jurisdiction? After all, according to McIntyre, corpo-
rate tax policy intentionally targets them. 
 Third, the reference to “meaningful links” seems simply to be a 
restatement of the normative preference towards the real seat (“RS”) 
test. McIntyre’s approach seeks to combat tax avoidance enabled by the 
apparent electivity of corporate tax residence. Such an approach as-
sumes that electivity is bad. It assumes that there must be good reasons 
why we want to tax certain corporations in one jurisdiction, even 
though they “elect” to be residents in another. This is simply a different 
formulation of the RS test, as justified by benefits theory-based argu-
ments. 
 Other commentators have occasionally made explicit functional 
arguments to support specific residence tests.85 This Part addresses a 
few of these arguments. Such arguments, however, have been made 
sporadically, have assumed a single purpose for corporate taxation, and 
have not been made as part of an attempt to develop a cohesive model 
of corporate tax residence, as this Article does. 
B. Assumptions of the Functional Model of Corporate Tax Residence 
 This Article’s suggested functional approach to corporate tax resi-
dence rests on three important assumptions. The first is that the juris-
                                                                                                                      
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 1572. 
84 See infra notes 89–132 and accompanying text (discussing the various theoretical 
reasons why jurisdictions tax corporations). 
85 See infra notes 89–132 and accompanying text. 
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diction at issue is a residence-based jurisdiction. The “meaninglessness” 
of corporate tax residence has been constantly used to justify abandon-
ing worldwide taxation in favor of territorial taxation. Because one ex-
plicit purpose of this Article is to argue that such “meaninglessness” 
does not support abandoning residence-based taxation, the model is 
developed in a residence-based context. 
 The second assumption is that various jurisdictions impose corpo-
rate income tax for various reasons.86 Multiple commentators have sug-
gested multiple justifications for the imposition of corporate taxes, and 
different justifications have seemingly gained various levels of traction 
in different jurisdictions.87 Thus, the purpose of this Article’s model is 
not to develop a single “best” corporate tax-residence test. In fact, the 
model rejects the “best-test” approach and instead provides a blueprint 
for constructing a tax residence model out of various available legal 
building blocks. The “correct” model to adopt can be “formal” or “sub-
stantive” depending on the purpose one seeks to achieve in taxing cor-
porations. But being “formal” or “substantive” has no inherent value. 
 Third, the model assumes that it is plausible that within each juris-
diction there can be multiple reasons, beliefs, and policy purposes that 
support the taxation of corporations, and that such policy purposes 
may compete with each other. Corporate tax residence models are as-
sumed to be a legislative outcome of political compromise and conse-
quently heavily embedded in local contexts.88 
C. Constructing a Functional Model of Corporate Tax Residence 
 This Section outlines a single-purpose driven functional approach 
to corporate tax residence. As an initial theoretical step, the assumption 
is that corporate taxes are imposed in each jurisdiction for one reason 
only (though different jurisdictions may adopt different policy choices), 
and questions the best functional tests under this (unrealistic) assump-
tion. 
 This Section assumes and accepts the policy purposes suggested by 
scholars as a justification for the imposition of corporate taxes. This 
Section need not delve into the lively debate about which theory of 
corporate taxation is best. In the context of each suggested corporate 
                                                                                                                      
86 See Omri Y. Marian, Meaningless Comparisons: Corporate Tax Reform Discourse in the Unit-
ed States, 32 Va. Tax Rev. 133, 189–91 (2012) (discussing the possibility that different juris-
dictions tax corporations for different reasons). 
87 See infra notes 89–133 and accompanying text. 
88 See infra notes 134–135 and accompanying text (discussing the influence that con-
text has on formulating corporate tax residence tests). 
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tax residence test, this Section notes possible critiques of such tests and 
suggests functionally oriented responses to such critiques. It shows that 
the critiques lose much traction when confronted with a functional, 
rather than a normative, perception of corporate tax residence. 
1. Taxing Shareholders: Ownership Test 
 The question of the theoretical justification of corporate taxation 
is a controversial one. Multiple justifications are suggested. The first 
and most common justification views corporate tax as a proxy to the 
taxation of shareholders.89 The reasoning underlying this justification 
is that, “[w]ithout a corporate tax, high income individuals could 
channel funds into corporations, and, with a large part of earnings re-
tained, obtain lower tax rates than if they operated in partnership or 
proprietorship form or in a way that allowed them to be taxed as 
 function as an instrument for the taxa-
 publicly 
                                                                                                                     
such.”90 
 Considering such justification, the most obvious functional proxy 
for residence determination of a corporation is the residence of its ul-
timate shareholders.91 Indeed, several commentators have supported 
the adoption of corporate tax residence models that are dependent on 
the residence of the majority of shareholders, explicitly because such tax 
residence tests are expected to
tion of those shareholders.92 
 The main objection to such a model is based in administrative 
concerns. For example, an ownership test in the U.S. context has been 
rejected by one scholar because a bright line rule that considers the 
majority of shareholders is “hard to reconcile with the fact that
traded companies’ stock may frequently change hands . . . .”93 
 
89 See Kleinbard, supra note 4, at 159–60 (“[The] most coherent theory for the exis-
tence of a corporate income tax is that it serves as a substitute for the imposition of cur-
rent tax on the firm’s owners . . . .”). 
90 Jane G. Gravelle & Thomas L. Hungerford, Congressional Research Serv., 
Corporate Tax Reform: Issues for Congress 4 (2007). 
91 Task Force on International Tax Reform, supra note 2, at 748 (“An alternative approach 
is to analyze the corporation as an economic agent acting for its shareholders. . . . This 
would lead one to favor a test that determined the residence of the corporation based on 
the residence of the corporation’s shareholders.”). 
92 Robert A. Green, The Future of Source-Based Taxation of the Income of Multinational En-
terprises, 79 Cornell L. Rev. 18, 70–74 (1993); Kleinbard, supra note 4, at 160. 
93 Shaviro, supra note 5, at 415; see also Task Force on International Tax Reform, supra note 
2, at 753 (stating that “it would appear administratively difficult to apply the [shareholder 
composition] test in the context of publicly-traded corporations”). 
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 The objection to ownership-based determination is not difficult to 
overcome for several reasons. First, implicit in this objection is an as-
sumption that we only care about the tax residence of publicly traded 
entities. This may be the case in the United States,94 but not necessarily 
in other jurisdictions. If one seriously believes that the true goal of cor-
porate tax is to tax shareholders of all corporations, then there is no 
rob
des that in some circumstances, it is theoretically 
dence change. If, on average, eighty-seven percent of the stock is owned 
                                                                                                                     
p lem in applying the shareholder ownership test to privately owned 
entities. 
 Second, even in the context of publicly traded entities, the fre-
quent trading of a corporation’s stock is not necessarily problematic. 
The concern, presumably, is the headache that will be generated by the 
possibility that any given traded entity will continuously shift from for-
eign to domestic tax status.95 This concern must be addressed in the 
context of public trading characteristics in any particular market. For 
example, U.S. residents own eighty-seven percent of the aggregate val-
ue of firms traded on U.S. stock markets.96 Based on this piece of data, 
one scholar conclu
sound to impose income tax on firms that are overwhelmingly owned 
by U.S. persons.97 
 Thus, although the stock of entities traded on U.S. exchanges fre-
quently changes hands, U.S. markets’ ownership data strongly implies 
that stock usually changes hands between all-U.S. parties. Assuming cor-
porate tax residence determination follows the residence of the majority 
of shareholders, it is hard to imagine a frequent occurrence of tax resi-
 
94 See infra note 167 and accompanying text (detailing how publicly traded corpora-
tions are the only entities treated as per se corporations for tax purposes under the United 
States’ “check the box regulations”). 
95 One could also raise an issue of identifying who the shareholders are. In the current 
tax-reporting environment, however, this is not a terribly difficult task. Individuals who 
trade listed securities typically do so through accounts in financial institutions. Such insti-
tutions typically must identify and keep record of the tax-residence of the account owners. 
See 26 C.F.R § 1.441-1(b)(2) (2012) (describing the regulations for individuals). The iden-
tification requirement also applies to foreign financial institutions. See I.R.C. §§ 1471–1474 
(2006). 
96 Kleinbard, supra note 4, at 159. The eighty-seven percent figure is still current; an-
other study suggested that as of 2012, international investors owned as little as thirteen 
percent in U.S. equities. See Joe Weisenthal, Chart of the Day: Here’s Who Owns the Stock Mar-
ket, Bus. Insider (Nov. 30, 2012, 2:28 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/heres-who-
owns-the-stock-market-2012-11. 
97 Kleinbard, supra note 4, at 159–60 (explaining how this conclusion is warranted if 
the jurisdiction determines that corporate income tax is best justified as a substitute tax on 
U.S. individual owners and that taxing U.S. individuals on their worldwide income is ap-
propriate). 
1640 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 54:1613 
by U.S. residents, more than thirty-seven percent of the stock will have 
to change hands from U.S. to foreign shareholders, in order for the corpo-
te 
he foreign shareholders 
mestic residents. Thus, such income is taxed to the sharehold-
                                                                                                                     
ra tax residence to be affected.98 
 Additionally, the concern of frequent changes in tax residence 
could be ameliorated by making ownership determinations on a time-
average basis. For example, a corporation could be considered a resi-
dent in a jurisdiction in which an average majority of its shareholders 
resided over a period of three years. Thus, even if a significant amount 
of corporate stock changes hands from U.S. to foreign shareholders, 
the corporation will become foreign only if t
hold the stock for a significant period of time. 
 Third, overcoming the objections to ownership-based determina-
tion is possible because most countries’ tax systems already use legal 
models that “look through” corporations to determine beneficial own-
ership for tax purposes. One such model, adopted by almost all indus-
trialized jurisdictions, is the controlled foreign corporation (“CFC”) 
regime.99 Although CFC regimes vary in composition and complexity, 
they all share a common theme: preventing domestic taxpayers from 
avoiding current taxation by channeling income through foreign-
owned corporations, thus deferring gain recognition until income is 
repatriated to the home jurisdiction (this practice is known as “defer-
ral”).100 Jurisdictions adopting CFC regimes (including the U.S.) “look 
through” corporate structures to determine the ultimate beneficial 
owners of foreign corporations.101 If a foreign corporation is ultimately 
found to be majority-owned by certain residents of the taxing jurisdic-
tion, some or all of the corporation’s income is deemed distributed to 
the do
ers.102 
 CFC ownership-determination models can be used not only to de-
termine specific tax consequences, but also to determine corporate tax 
 
98 See id. 
99 Avi-Yonah, Sartori & Marian, supra note 5, at 160 (discussing the proliferation of 
CFC regimes). 
100 See Kleinbard, supra note 75, at 718–22 (describing how deferral regimes reduce ef-
fective tax rates). 
101 See I.R.C. § 958 (2006) (providing the ownership attribution rules for CFC pur-
poses). One example of such a “look through” rule is a provision found in most U.S. tax 
treaties that provides for a limitation of benefits. See, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury , United 
States Model Income Tax Convention of November 15, 2006, art. 22, ¶¶ 2(c), 2(e), 
3(c) (outlining certain beneficial ownership rules in order to determine whether corpora-
tions are entitled to enjoy treaty benefits). 
102 See I.R.C. §§ 951–957. 
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residence. One scholar, Daniel Shaviro, objected to such an idea be-
cause it “would amount in practice to repealing deferral . . . .”103 This 
argument, although theoretically correct, does not negate a functional 
view of corporate tax residence. An argument against deferral is an ar-
gument about how the U.S. should substantively tax multinational cor-
porations, and not about how the U.S. should functionally determine 
their tax residence. Shaviro’s argument takes a position that deferral is 
a good thing, even though it operates against worldwide residence-
based taxation.104 But if one accepts the argument that current world-
wide taxation of U.S. residents is desirable, then Shaviro’s response 
amounts to an objection to an ownership test because it actually 
achieves the desired result. Thus, Shaviro’s objection does not respond 
to the functionality of the ownership test to the extent the purpose is 
actually to tax shareholders on a worldwide basis. At most, it argues 
ain
 Revenue Code, and there is no need to stray far in search 
f a 
                                                                                                                     
ag st the purpose the ownership test intends to serve. 
 Lastly, some jurisdictions actually consider corporate ownership 
explicitly for purposes of making corporate tax residence determina-
tions. Such models may provide comparative guidance. The most strik-
ing example is the U.S.’s anti-inversion rules in Section 7874 of the 
Code. Section 7874 of the Code was added as part of the Job Creation 
Act of 2004, with the aim of combating expatriation (or “inversion”) of 
U.S. corporations.105 Section 7874 is discussed further below,106 but the 
pertinent fact for now is that under Section 7874, if after an “inversion 
transaction” at least eighty percent (in vote and value) of the stock of a 
foreign-incorporated entity is owned by shareholders of the inverting 
U.S. corporation, the foreign corporation is treated as a domestic cor-
poration for U.S. tax purposes.107 Thus, an explicit model for corporate 
tax residence determination based on ownership is already found in 
the Internal
o model. 
 Other jurisdictions have also adopted ownership-related tax resi-
dence models. For example, a company conducting business in Austra-
lia will be deemed a resident of Australia for tax purposes if the share-
holders that control at least fifty percent of its voting power are 
 
Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418 (2004). 
103 Shaviro, supra note 5, at 415. 
104 See id. at 416–17, 427. 
105 See American Jobs Creation 
106 See infra notes 141–152 and accompanying text. 
107 I.R.C. § 7874(b) (2006). 
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Australian residents.108 In Italy, a foreign-incorporated corporation that 
holds a majority interest in Italian entities, and is also majority-owned 
by Italian residents, is presumed to be a resident in Italy for tax pur-
poses.109 Although such models may or may not provide constructive 
guidance to other countries, they are certainly worth considering be-
fore dismissing an ownership test as non-administrable. 
T
orate tax, therefore, as a 
e p
                                                                                                                     
2. he Benefits of Incorporation: The Place of Incorporation 
 Another possible justification for the imposition of corporate in-
come tax considers that the operation in a corporation confers certain 
benefits to shareholders, such as limited liability, transferability of in-
terests, and so on. This justification views corp
fe aid in consideration for these benefits.110 
 Most U.S. scholars reject this idea as having an explanatory value 
for understanding the origins (or ongoing existence) of U.S. corporate 
taxation.111 Indeed, the U.S. effectively collects corporate tax only from 
publicly traded corporations, while most other entities that confer lim-
ited liability to their owners are effectively exempt from corporate taxa-
tion.112 That is not the case, however, in many other countries. In Japan 
(until recently a residence-based jurisdiction),113 most business entities 
that confer limited liability to their owners are subject to corporate tax 
(including certain limited liability partnerships). Similarly, in France, 
partnership profits attributed to limited partners are taxed at the part-
nership level. Accordingly, it seems that the benefits-of-incorporation 
function of corporate taxation is still plausible in some jurisdictions. 
 In such cases, the functional tax residence test is the place of in-
corporation (“POI”). “[T]he [POI] test seems to rely on the notion 
that a corporation is able to earn income by virtue of being a juridical 
entity, in that it derives its income-earning capacity from the granting of 
 
108 See Michael Dirkis, Australia, in Residence of Companies, supra note 27, at 311, 
324
 note 27, at 519, 540–44 
(dis
ubstance in the Taxation of Multina-
tion
w 
of c
ompanies, and “subchapter S” corporations are gen-
erall
74–77, 194 (discussing Japan’s 2007 tax system reform 
from
–29 (discussing the ownership-presumption model adopted in Australia). 
109 See Mario Tenore, Italy, in Residence of Companies, supra
cussing the ownership-presumption model adopted in Italy). 
110 Avi-Yonah, supra note 38, at 1205–06; Michael S. Kirsch, The Congressional Response to 
Corporate Expatriations: The Tension Between Symbols and S
al Corporations, 24 Va. Tax Rev. 475, 564–67 (2005). 
111 See Avi-Yonah, supra note 38, at 1209 (explaining the reasons why a real-entity vie
orporate tax is “unpersuasive”); Bank, Entity Theory as Myth, supra note 42, at 465–67. 
112 Partnerships, limited liability c
y exempt from entity-level taxes. 
113 See Marian, supra note 86, at 1
 a global to territorial system). 
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its charter.”114 It follows that “[t]he jurisdiction granting the charter 
and investing the entity with the legal capacity to earn income then has 
e r
void taxation by simply 
co
usly argue against 
non-taxation if taxpayers elect out of these benefits. 
. Re
agement hinders the proper function of a 
ber
     
th ight to tax that income when it arises.”115 
 The main objection to the POI test is that it is extremely easy to 
manipulate.116 For example, one could easily a
in rporating outside the home jurisdiction.117 
 From a functional point of view, however, the objection to the POI 
test is not necessarily problematic. Once a corporation is incorporated 
under the laws of some other “foreign” jurisdiction, the assumption 
that the corporation is able to earn income by virtue of the charter 
granted by the “domestic” jurisdiction no longer stands. Thus, to the 
extent one subscribes to the theory that corporate taxation is a fee for 
the benefits of corporate law, one could not serio
3. Corporate Tax As Regulation: Two Options 
a gulation as a Democratic Argument: POEM/CMC 
 One interest justifying corporate taxation as a regulatory device is 
the promotion of democratic principles. Reuven Avi-Yonah argues that 
U.S. corporate taxation was originally justified “as a means to control 
the excessive accumulation of power in the hands of corporate man-
agement . . . .”118 Specifically, Avi-Yonah argues that excessive power in 
the hands of corporate man
li al democratic polity.119 
 One logical inference would be to adopt a residence test that de-
pends on Place of Effective Management (“POEM”) or Central Man-
agement and Control (“CMC”), namely, tests that depend on the place 
                                                                                                                 
114 Tillinghast, supra note 4, at 259. 
115 Id. 
116 Task Force on International Tax Reform, supra note 2, at 747 (noting that “[t]he place 
of o
 reducing 
U.S yond Territoriality and Deferral: The Promise 
of “ ontrolled” (Aug. 2011) (Univ. of Mich. Law Sch., Working Paper No. 
248
rganization test also provides taxpayers with a substantial amount of electivity in terms 
of deciding whether to subject the relevant corporation . . . to the U.S. tax regime applica-
ble to domestic . . . corporations.”). 
117 See, e.g., Kleinbard, supra note 75, at 706–13 (describing a tax scheme known as the 
“Double Irish Dutch Sandwich” where foreign incorporation plays a key role in
. tax liabilities); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Be
Managed and C
) (suggesting that the CMC test remains necessary to combat tax evasion). 
118 Avi-Yonah, supra note 38, at 1249. 
119 Id. at 1244. 
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of actual management (both tests will be referred to herein as CMC).120 
If such tests are adopted, then corporate tax works to counterbalance 
the managers’ excessive accumulation of power gained through trans-
acting business in the jurisdiction by taxing the gains from such busi-
anaging and controlling a corporation from a foreign ju-
sdi
                                                                                                                     
ness. 
 Two main objections are frequently raised against the CMC test. 
The first is that it is difficult to administer, and essentially elective. So-
phisticated managers could carefully plan their circumstances so as to 
be deemed m
ri ction.121 
 This argument is unpersuasive. The CMC test is the one corporate 
tax residence model that has been tested in multiple jurisdictions and 
has endured more than a century of extreme shifts in global socio-
economic structures, including the world-sweeping reforms of tax sys-
tems.122 The CMC test was adopted by the U.K. over 150 years ago, and 
since then, variants of the test have been adopted by all Commonwealth 
jurisdictions, as well as many Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (“OECD”) member countries.123 Although the CMC 
test has certainly undergone variations, its main principle, as articulated 
 
120 Theoretically, one could also argue that managers are most powerful in the jurisdic-
tion where most corporate assets and capital are located, which could be different from the 
jurisdiction in which managers reside. This option is not explored in this Article, but would 
presumably call for a residence test that is based on the place where the economic activity of 
the corporation resides. This could be determined by formulary apportionment that allo-
cates the economic attributes of a corporation among jurisdiction. Formulary apportionment 
is traditionally understood to be a proxy for the source of income. In such a case, however, it 
would be used to determine residence. See generally Kimberley A. Clausing & Reuven S. Avi-
Yonah, Reforming Corporate Taxation in a Global Economy: A Proposal to Adopt Formulary Appor-
tionment (Brookings Inst., Hamilton Proj., Discussion Paper No. 2007-08, 2007), http:// 
www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2007/6/corporatetaxes%20clausing/ 
200706clausing_aviyonah.pdf (discussing formulary apportionment in the context of reform-
ing the U.S tax system). 
121 See supra notes 62–63 and accompanying text. 
122 In the 1980s, the world underwent a so-called “world tax reform.” During this pe-
riod, multiple countries reformed their corporate tax systems by reducing tax rates and 
expanding the corporate tax-base. See generally World Tax Reform: Case Studies of De-
veloped and Developing Countries (Michael J. Boskin & Charles E. McLure, Jr., eds., 
1990) (describing tax reforms, or tax reform proposals and debates, that occurred in Aus-
tralia, Canada, Israel, Japan, Sweden, the U.K., China, Colombia, Indonesia, the U.S., and 
Mexico during the 1980s). 
123 See Couzin, supra note 27, at 56–57. See generally John F. Avery Jones, Corporate Resi-
dence in Common Law: The Origins and Current Issues, in Residence of Companies, supra 
note 27, at 121 (discussing the origins, durability, and proliferation of the CMC tests); 
John F. Avery Jones, Jurisdiction to Tax Companies: The Influences of the Jurisdiction of the Courts 
and of European Thinking, in 4 Studies in the History of Tax Law 163 (John Tiley ed., 
2010) (same). 
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in the 1906 decision by the House of Lords in De Beers Consolidated Mines, 
Ltd. v. Howe,124 is cited to this day.125 CMC models have been imple-
sideration, rather than dismissal for 
ar 
arters elsewhere, resulting in the loss of the positive external-
es.
that is preferably geographically close to the manager’s home jurisdic-
                                                                                                                     
mented and administered successfully by multiple jurisdictions. 
 Admittedly, when constructing a comparative legal model for pur-
poses of one’s own jurisdiction, one must question if a model adopted 
widely in other jurisdictions is indeed the same model in all such juris-
dictions, or if local variants actually transformed it into various different 
models.126 One also has to question if a widely adopted model can nec-
essarily be implemented in a particular jurisdiction, given each target 
jurisdiction’s unique circumstances.127 At least as a heuristic device, 
however, the fact that CMC is widely and successfully implemented im-
plies that it warrants serious con
fe of administrative difficulties. 
 The second argument against a CMC test has been discussed above 
and is associated with the positive externalities that are created by locat-
ing corporate headquarters within a particular jurisdiction.128 That is, 
adoption of a CMC test creates tax costs on locating headquarters in 
the jurisdiction. This scheme incentivizes corporations to locate their 
headqu
iti  
 This argument, however, assumes that individual managers are 
willing to physically move to another jurisdiction just to save money for 
a corporation (in which they do not necessarily own any equity). Based 
on practical experience, it is hard to convince managers to relocate. 
For a person to be willing to move to a new jurisdiction, the new juris-
diction must be appealing. Such a place would need to be a jurisdiction 
 
124 De Beers Consol. Mines, Ltd. v. Howe, [1906] A.C. 455 (H.L.) (appeal taken from 
Eng.). Many regard the De Beers decision as the true birth of the CMC test. See, e.g., McIn-
tyre, supra note 5, at 1569 (referring to De Beers as “seminal”); Christiana HJI Panayi, United 
Kingdom, in Residence of Companies, supra note 27, at 817, 827 (referring to De Beers as 
“the landmark case”). 
125 See HM Revenue and Customs, ITNM120060—Company Residence: The Case 
Law Rule—Central Management and Control, § INTM120060 (2010), available at 
http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/intmanual/intm120060.htm. 
126 See Omri Y. Marian, The Discursive Failure in Comparative Tax Law, 58 Am. J. Comp. L. 
415, 432–35 (2010) (discussing the cultural approach to comparative law that rejects the 
assumption of similarities in social problems and legal solutions). 
127 Anthony C. Infanti, The Ethics of Tax Cloning, 6 Fla. Tax Rev. 251, 319–36 (2003) 
(discussing the challenges of legal transplantation or “cloning” of tax models from one 
jurisdiction to another). 
128 Tax Reform Options, supra note 32, at 44–47 (statement of James R. Hines, Jr., Profes-
sor, University of Michigan Law School); Shaviro, supra note 5, at 414. 
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tion, relatively developed so as to be attractive to individuals, and con-
tain very low corporate taxes. 
 Most low-tax jurisdictions are not appealing for long-term resi-
dence as they are largely tax havens with no real infrastructure. In the 
context of U.S. tax planning, for example, many intracompany tax-
induced transactions involve the pocketbook incorporation of entities 
in tax havens such as the Cayman Islands. Such transactions only work 
because these pocketbook entities’ foreign status is respected. If the 
U.S. were to adopt a CMC test, managers would actually have to move 
to such jurisdictions for the entities to maintain their foreign status. It is 
hard to believe U.S. based CEOs, CFOs, and board members would 
pack up in the thousands, take their families with them, and move to 
the Cayman Islands just to change their corporation’s residence. There 
may be a few cases of this sort, but this “negative incentive” argument is 
not necessarily a cause for major concern.129 
 The problem of relocation, however, may be more acute in the 
EU. For example, any board-member of a U.K. company has a nearby 
industrialized jurisdiction which is culturally similar to the U.K. and 
with very low taxes—Ireland. Similarly, a German board member might 
find Luxemburg appealing. The bottom line is that the negative incen-
tive argument must be contextualized. 
 A second response to the concern about CMC-driven corporate 
migration is a direct derivative of a functional view of corporate tax res-
idence. Even if some managers were to leave the jurisdiction that 
adopted a CMC test, this is not a cause for concern under a functional 
view. In such a case, the functional justification to tax the expatriating 
corporation would be lost. Because the managers are no longer resi-
dents of the jurisdiction, the democratic argument no longer justifies 
the regulation of such managers. In this context then, non-taxation is 
the correct result. 
 If one is still concerned about management expatriation, it might 
be because the real reason for taxing corporation is not to regulate 
managers, but some other reason. In the alternative, it can simply be 
the case that corporate tax rates are set at uncompetitive rates. In such 
                                                                                                                      
129 Other commentators have suggested that the concern that management will expa-
triate under a CMC regime is overstated. See, e.g., Kirsch, supra note 110, at 574 (finding 
the relocation of corporate management to places outside of the United States unlikely 
because “key management personnel might object to being uprooted from their long es-
tablished homes in the United States”); Avi-Yonah,  supra note 117 (suggesting that the 
CMC test would deter tax planning because it would force managers to manage U.S. firms 
from abroad). 
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a case, the correct response is to reduce corporate tax rates, and not to 
create a loophole in the tax base in the form of a dysfunctional tax res-
idence test. 
b. Regulation of Capital Markets: Place of Listing 
 Another regulatory argument for corporate taxation is that it can 
enhance corporate governance in public corporations. Under this ar-
gument, “corporate tax is necessary because otherwise the agency-cost 
problem will be exacerbated when management . . . face a different tax 
rate for corporate actions than some shareholders.”130 If such argu-
ments are persuasive, a tax residence test must capture corporations 
where such problems arise, namely public corporations that list their 
securities in the jurisdiction concerned with such corporate govern-
ance issues.131 
 The functional tax residence test that supports such a purpose 
would be in the place where the corporate securities are listed. Under 
such a test, all (and only) the entities that display these agency prob-
lems would be captured under the tax. 
 It is possible that different residence tests would be adopted for 
purposes of defining the tax residence of non-publicly traded entities in 
which agency costs are not commonly a cause for concern. If non-
publicly traded corporations are still subject to corporate taxation in a 
place of listing jurisdiction, it is hopefully because there are other pol-
icy purposes that justify their taxation as well. 
 The main objection to a place of listing test is that it puts the local 
exchanges at a disadvantage by creating a tax cost for trading in such 
exchanges. The same functional counterargument applies here, as in 
the case of objections for using POI and CMC tests. If a company elects 
                                                                                                                      
130 Avi-Yonah, supra note 38, at 1208; see Jennifer Arlen & Deborah M. Weiss, A Political 
Theory of Corporate Taxation, 105 Yale L.J. 325, 327 (1995) (noting that the “resilience of 
the corporate tax is a manifestation of the most enduring source of problems in corporate 
law, the separation between ownership and control of large corporations”); Hideki Kanda 
& Saul Levmore, Taxes, Agency Costs, and the Price of Incorporation, 77 Va. L. Rev. 211, 229–31 
(1991) (describing, by way of example, the agency cost problem that may arise in public 
corporations). 
131 Depending on market structures, agency problems vary across jurisdictions. In con-
centrated markets, agency issues arise as conflicts between majority and minority sharehold-
ers. In dispersed markets, however, conflicts may arise between managers and public share-
holders. The U.S. system of corporate taxation operates in a dispersed market, whereas other 
OECD countries have concentrated markets. See generally Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-
de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J. Fin. 471 (1999) (em-
ploying data on ownership structures to demonstrate that in countries lacking strong share-
holder protection, there are few firms that are widely held by shareholders). 
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out of the exchange, the agency costs are no longer of a concern for 
the jurisdiction, and need not be regulated via corporate taxation. 
Some may still be concerned, however, for competitive reasons. In such 
a case, the solution—like in the case of CMC—would be to lower cor-
porate tax rates, rather than to “punch loopholes” in the corporate tax 
base in the form of adopting dysfunctional residence tests. 
4. Access to Liquid Capital: Place of Listing 
 The last theory of corporate taxation this Article discusses views 
the imposition of corporate tax as a fee paid for the access to liquid 
capital.132 According to this justification, the main benefits of operating 
in a corporate form are the abilities to raise capital from the public and 
to efficiently liquidate securities. Thus, corporate taxation is the fee 
imposed on shareholders and managers in publicly traded corporations 
in return for such benefits. Such a view would clearly call for the de-
termination of corporate tax residence based on the place where the 
securities are listed. 
 The theory that corporate taxation is the fee for liquidity benefits 
also provides a response to the critique that a place of listing test would 
discourage listing. Presumably, corporate managers base their decision 
of where to list on multiple considerations. They are buying into a 
product (the public exchange) that includes, for example, access to 
investors and to a specific scheme of securities regulations. If the price 
the managers have to pay includes corporate taxes, they will factor that 
into their cost analysis. To the extent managers eventually decide not to 
list in one jurisdiction but instead to list in another, it means that they 
have reached a conclusion that the cost of listing in the first jurisdiction 
is too high. As in any market, the manufacturer of the product (i.e., the 
jurisdiction of the exchange) can do one of two things: improve the 
product to justify the price, or reduce the price to match the quality of 
the product. If one takes seriously the view that taxation is the price 
managers and shareholders pay to raise capital and quickly liquidate 
securities, then it makes no sense to dismiss place of listing because it 
creates costs—we want it to create costs! Paying the jurisdiction for cre-
ating the public market is the very reason to collect corporate tax un-
der this view. 
                                                                                                                      
132 See, e.g., Calvin H. Johnson, Commentary, Replace the Corporate Tax with a Market Cap-
italization Tax, 117 Tax Notes 1082, 1084 (2007); Rebecca S. Rudnick, Who Should Pay the 
Corporate Tax in a Flat Tax World?, 39 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 965, 1099 (1989). 
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 If corporate taxes discourage listing, it means that either corporate 
taxes are set at uncompetitive rates, or that the product (such as the 
securities regulation scheme) needs improvement. It does not make 
sense to deal with such issues by adopting a dysfunctional tax residence 
model. 
III. Possible Critiques of the Functional Approach 
 There are three types of possible critiques to using the functional 
approach in the design of corporate tax residence models. The first two 
critiques are that functional models are difficult to administer and that 
they create negative incentives. Section A of this Part discusses these 
critiques and dismisses them. The third critique is that functional mod-
els fail to consider that jurisdictions tax corporations for multiple rea-
sons. Section B responds to this third critique. 
A. Administrative Difficulties and Disincentives Do Not Negate the  
Functional Approach 
1. Administrative Difficulties 
 One might argue that adopting some of the models suggested by 
the functional approach may create certain administrative difficulties. 
This type of critique targets the specific models suggested and not at 
the functional approach itself. Such a critique would be a restatement 
of the general objection to the real seat (“RS”) test because it is “fact-
intensive” and thus difficult to administer. 
 Part II responds to different administrative-based objections in the 
context of each proposed functional test.133 It concluded, however, that 
such concerns are generally overstated. More broadly, relatively few 
facts need to be determined under a functional approach. The func-
tional approach does not seek multiple “connecting factors” of a cor-
poration to a jurisdiction in order to substantiate the “most meaning-
ful” connection. Rather, the functional approach seeks only the 
connecting factors that are relevant to the purpose the residence test is 
intended to serve. 
                                                                                                                      
133 See supra notes 89–133 and accompanying text (discussing the functional models to 
corporate tax residence and the administratively-based objections to its implementation). 
1650 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 54:1613 
2. Negative Incentives 
 A second line of critiques concerns the negative incentives that 
some of the suggested tests may create, or in other words, the behav-
ioral distortions created by certain corporate tax residence tests. Such 
concerns are expressions of a general normative preference of effi-
ciency as a policy guide. As Part I showed, efficiency does not support 
the policy purposes of corporate taxation. 
 Moreover, Part II responded to such concerns within the context 
of each residence test suggested and demonstrated that such concerns 
are, for the most part, exaggerated as a factual matter.134 In addition, 
Part II explained that such concerns do not negate the functional ap-
proach. If anything, the concerns support a functional approach. When 
a specific functional residence test drives corporations out of the juris-
diction, it necessarily means that the justification to tax such corpora-
tions is lost. If we are still concerned about such corporate expatriation, 
then it means that corporate tax rates are set at uncompetitive rates. In 
the alternative, if we believe that there are still valid reasons why we 
must tax an “expatriating corporation,” it means that we adopted the 
wrong functional corporate tax residence test to begin with. 
 To summarize, incentive-related arguments, as well as administra-
tion-related arguments, do not pose a particularly difficult challenge to 
a functional view of corporate tax residence. 
B. Adjusting the Functional Model for Multiplicity of Purposes 
 The third line of possible critiques to the functional approach to 
corporate tax residence has to do with the fact that, as a practical mat-
ter, jurisdictions tax corporations for many different reasons. Admit-
tedly, the functional model suggested above takes a one-dimensional 
view that abstracts complex realities, and therefore may provide little or 
no guidance for actual tax policymaking. This is the most serious possi-
ble critique of the functional approach. There are, however, good re-
sponses to this critique, and the functional approach could be adjusted 
to consider the multiplicity of purposes of corporate taxation. There 
are three possible ways in which a functional corporate tax residence 
construct can be adjusted to deal with the fact that corporations are 
taxed for multiple reasons. 
                                                                                                                      
134 Id. 
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1. The Under-Inclusive Response: Ideological Choice of a Single Test 
 The easiest theoretical response to the issue of multiplicity of pur-
poses for taxing corporations is to make a conscious choice between 
competing policy purposes. From a purely theoretical point of view, this 
response is probably desirable because such a choice clearly reflects the 
ideological selections made within a jurisdiction. For example, if tax-
policy makers in a jurisdiction believe that it is justified to tax corpora-
tions both as a means to tax shareholders and as a means to reduce 
agency costs, an election between an ownership test or a listing test 
would express the prevailing ideological preference. Such a response to 
multiplicity of purposes, however, is probably more than one could 
hope for in most jurisdictions. If political forces genuinely interact, 
most legal models are the result of a political compromise, and not a 
clear-cut ideological expression. 
2. The Possibly Over-Inclusive Response: Alternative Residence Tests 
 On the other side of the spectrum, the easiest practical way to re-
spond to the issue of multiplicity of purposes is simply to have alterna-
tive corporate tax residence tests, where the satisfaction of any one of 
them will cause a corporation to become a resident for tax purposes. 
 This is probably the approach that most countries take, based on 
anecdotal evidence. For example, in most Commonwealth countries, a 
corporation will be a tax resident if it is either incorporated in the ju-
risdiction, or managed and controlled from within such jurisdiction.135 
Similarly, most civil law countries combine alternative criteria, with no 
hierarchical relationships among the alternatives.136 Although adopting 
various residence tests is easy to implement, it may also result in over-
inclusiveness of entities that are not otherwise a policy target of corpo-
rate taxation. 
3. The Context-Sensitive Response: A Single Test That Supports 
Multiple Purposes 
 The middle way to respond to the multiple policy purposes for 
which a jurisdiction taxes corporations is to reach a political compro-
mise that adopts one corporate tax residence test (or a combination of 
as few tests as possible) that supports all (or as many as possible) com-
peting purposes. 
                                                                                                                      
135 Ault & Arnold, supra note 24, at 435. 
136 De Broe, supra note 27, at 96 n.4. 
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 The viability of this option will depend on the interaction between 
the nature of the competing purposes and the local contexts of each 
specific jurisdiction. Specifically, although the theoretical model above 
identifies a single tax residence test to support each possible purpose of 
corporate taxation, it is possible that under specific local contexts, oth-
er models would work as well. Under a pure functional perspective, for 
example, the place of incorporation (“POI”) test supposedly supports 
the benefits-of-incorporation theory of corporate taxation. If residents 
in a jurisdiction tend to incorporate their corporations within their 
home jurisdiction, however (perhaps as a result of non-tax legal re-
quirements, or home-bias), the POI test would capture both the bene-
fits of incorporation and the taxation of shareholders (because locally 
incorporated entities are also owned by domestic residents). 
 Such an approach may be possible, but requires a close inspection 
of local characteristics. Part IV explores the practicality of such an ap-
proach in the context of the current economic environment in the 
United States. 
IV. Reviewing Current Corporate Tax Residence Determination 
in the United States 
 This Part explores the applicability of the proposed functional ap-
proach in implementing legislative reforms in the United States. Sec-
tion A of this Part examines the current discourse on the determina-
tion of corporate tax residence in the United States, arguing that 
current talks of reform fail to consider the policy reasons behind cor-
porate taxation in the United States. Section B discusses how the func-
tional approach can be utilized to provide new insights into the reform 
discussion. In doing so, Section B shows how, under a functional analy-
sis, the POI test—as currently adopted—fails to support U.S. corporate 
tax policies. Finally, Section C suggests a functional corporate tax-
residence model to support the purposes that underlie corporate taxa-
tion in the United States. 
A. Current Debate Is Guided by the Dysfunctional Normative Dichotomy 
 The United States adopted the POI test in the War Revenue Act of 
1917.137 Section 200 of the 1917 Act defined a “domestic” corporation 
as any corporation “created under the law of the United States, or of 
                                                                                                                      
137 War Revenue Act, Pub. L. No. 65-50, § 200, 40 Stat. 300, 302 (1917). 
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any State, Territory, or District thereof.”138 This definition survived 
largely unchanged to this day. Currently, under section 7701(a)(4) of 
the Code, a corporation is considered “domestic” for federal income 
tax purposes if it is “created or organized in the United States or under 
the law of the United States or of any State . . . .”139 
 Despite the POI test’s long-established history in the United States, 
many scholars harshly criticize this test, primarily claiming that the POI 
test easily facilitates tax avoidance. All one needs to do in order to claim 
“foreign” status for U.S. corporate income tax purposes is to incorpo-
rate elsewhere. There is no need to have any assets, employees, or other 
economic attributes in the jurisdiction of incorporation. Thus, these 
scholars view the concept of U.S. corporate tax-residence  as “meaning-
less.”140 
 As Part I details, responses to the meaninglessness of corporate tax 
residence tend to take one of two shapes. One approach, the pragmatic 
approach, is to accept reality (namely, that there is little we can do 
about the de facto electivity of corporate tax residence), and minimize 
                                                                                                                      
138 Id. The same jurisdictional principals instituted in the War Revenue Act have been 
adopted implicitly even earlier than 1917. The 1917 Act was merely a semantic change to 
an already functioning jurisdictional concept. Specifically, the Corporate Excise Tax Act of 
1909 established the same residence-based system of taxation. Act of Aug. 5, 1909, § 38, 36 
Stat. 11, 112 (1909). Although the 1909 Act did not explicitly define the terms “domestic” 
or “foreign,” the Act conferred taxing jurisdiction to “every corporation, joint stock com-
pany or association, organized for profit and having a capital stock represented by shares” 
if the entity was either “organized under the laws of the United States or any State or Terri-
tory of the United States . . . or hereafter organized under the laws of any foreign country 
and engaged in business in any State or Territory of the United States . . . .” Id.; see also 
William P. McClure & Herman B. Bouma, The Taxation of Foreign Income from 1909 to 1989: 
How a Tilted Playing Field Developed, 43 Tax Notes 1379, 1381 (1989). For corporations 
organized under the laws of foreign countries, the tax applied to net income “from busi-
ness transacted and capital invested within the United States and its Territories . . . .” Act of 
Aug. 5, 1909, § 38. The same concepts have appeared in the first attempt by Congress to 
enact corporate tax in 1894. See 26 Cong. Rec. S6800, S6831 (1894). The House version of 
the 1894 Bill applied taxation jurisdiction to corporations and associations “organized for 
profit by virtue of the laws of the United States or of any State or Territory, by means of which the 
liability of the individual stockholders is in any way limited.” See id. (emphasis added) 
(reading the House of Representatives version of the 1894 Bill into the record). The juris-
dictional application of the tax, however, was changed in the final version of the Bill, with-
out explanation, to apply to “corporations, companies, or associations doing business for 
profit in the United States, no matter how created and organized.” See id. (emphasis added); 
Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Corporate Regulation and the Origins of the Corporate Income Tax, 66 
Ind. L.J. 53, 87 (1990). Ultimately, however, the 1894 Act was struck down by the Supreme 
Court. See Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 583–86 (1895), aff’d on reh’g, 
158 U.S. 601 (1895). 
139 I.R.C. § 7701 (2006). 
140 See, e.g., Graetz, supra note 4, at 320–23; Kleinbard, supra note 4, at 158–62; Tilling-
hast, supra note 4, at 260; Avi-Yonah, supra note 4. 
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the importance of U.S. corporate tax residence determination to tax 
outcomes. Under this approach, the remedy is to adopt a territorial 
system of taxation.141 Part I explains, however, that adopting a territo-
rial system would not diminish the importance of determining corpo-
rate tax residence.142 
 Moreover, if one argues that the U.S. should change its interna-
tional tax system from global to territorial, such an argument must be 
grounded in first-order tax policy making. For example, one could ar-
gue that a territorial system is preferable in order to meet international 
competitive pressures.143 To the extent we believe such arguments, we 
might accept an explicit choice to reform the U.S. international tax 
system. Indeed, it seems to have been the exact reason why the United 
Kingdom recently reformed its tax system from global to territorial.144 
 It does not follow, however, that the U.S. should change its entire 
tax system from a global system to a territorial one just because our 
century-old corporate tax residence test—which the U.S. can conceiva-
bly reform—does not support global taxation. 
 The second approach addressing the “meaninglessness” of corpo-
rate tax residence determination is to debate corporate tax residence 
concepts in such a way as to make them “meaningful.” The problem, as 
described below, is that the U.S. debate is guided by the same unhelpful 
normative dichotomy between formal and substantive tests, as de-
scribed in Part I. 
 Calls for reform in the definition of domestic corporations gained 
considerable traction in the early 2000s, when the phenomenon of 
“corporate inversions” received public attention. In a typical inversion 
transaction, a publicly traded U.S. corporation would merge into, or 
                                                                                                                      
141 Graetz, supra note 4, at 320–23; Shaviro, supra note 5, at 415–17. 
142 See supra notes 70–79 and accompanying text. 
143 See, e.g., House. Comm. on Ways and Means, 112th Cong., Ways and Means Dis-
cussion Draft: Tax Reform Act of 2011 8–31 (Oct. 26, 2011), http://waysandmeans. 
house.gov/UploadedFiles/Discussion_Draft.pdf; CEO Perspectives on How the Tax Code Affects 
Hiring, Businesses, and Economic Growth: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 112th Cong. 35–
43 (2011) (statement of Michael T. Duke, President and Chief Executive Officer, WalMart 
Stores, Inc.); id. at 43–51 (statement of Thomas J. Falk, Chairman and Chief Executive 
Officer, Kimberly-Clark Corporation); id. at 53–62 (statement of Gregory S. Lang, Presi-
dent and Chief Executive Officer, PMC-Sierra); How Other Countries Have Used Tax Reform to 
Help Their Companies Compete in the Global Market and Create Jobs: Hearing Before the H. Comm. 
on Ways and Means, 112th Cong. 7–13 (2011) (statement of Gary M. Thomas, Partner, 
White and Case); id. at 23–37 (statement of Stephen Edge, Partner, Slaughter and May); 
Nat’l Comm’n on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform, The Moment of Truth 8 (2010). 
144 See Marian, supra note 86, at 179–80 (articulating why the set of circumstances that 
caused the U.K. to reform its international tax system are inapplicable to the Unites 
States). 
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would be “bought” by, a foreign-incorporated shell entity (“surrogate 
entity”) that was a resident in a low-tax jurisdiction. In consideration for 
the purchase or merger, the shareholders of the U.S. entity would re-
ceive equity interests in the foreign surrogate entity, which would then 
become the publicly traded entity. From an economic point of view, the 
only change is that the publicly traded entity suddenly became “for-
eign” for U.S. tax purposes by virtue of its incorporation in a foreign 
jurisdiction. The shareholders, assets, and operations of the group re-
mained the same. The only difference was that the “inverted” entity was 
no longer subject to U.S. tax jurisdiction.145 
 To fight such abuse, Congress enacted the “anti-inversion rule” in 
Section 7874 of the Code, which taxes certain gains of the surrogate 
entity for a period of ten years, while disallowing deductions and cred-
its.146 If certain thresholds of ownership by U.S. residents are met, the 
rule causes a surrogate entity incorporated abroad (and therefore oth-
erwise a foreign entity), to be treated as a domestic corporation for 
federal income tax purposes.147 
 Notwithstanding Section 7874, some believe that a reform to the 
U.S. corporate tax residence test is still required. For example, in 2005, 
the Joint Committee on Taxation (“JCT”) published a report discussing 
various “options to improve tax compliance and reform tax expendi-
tures.”148 Among other options, the JCT considered adding a rule un-
der which foreign-incorporated companies that are primarily managed 
and controlled from the United States would be U.S. residents for tax 
purposes.149 
 The JCT reasoned that such a test may be needed in addition to 
Section 7874, because even with an anti-inversion rule in place, U.S. 
multinational entities could use foreign-incorporated affiliates to ag-
gressively reduce their U.S. taxes.150 For example, by incorporating a 
subsidiary abroad, many times, the U.S. parent (or other affiliate) of a 
                                                                                                                      
145 See generally Kirsch, supra note 110, at 478–81 (providing a general description of 
corporate inversions); Bret Wells, Cant and the Inconvenient Truth About Corporate Inversions, 
136 Tax Notes 429 (2012) (describing the phenomena of corporate inversions, and the 
successes and failures of congressional response to such phenomena). 
146 I.R.C. § 7874 (2006). 
147 Id. 
148 See generally Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, 109th Cong., Options to Im-
prove Tax Compliance and Reform Tax Expenditures (Comm. Print 2005) (discussing 
a number of proposals that would reduce the size of the tax gap by curtailing tax shelters, 
closing unintended tax loopholes, or addressing other areas of noncompliance). 
149 Id. at 178–81. 
150 Id. at 179. 
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“foreign” corporation can avoid current U.S. taxation on income 
earned by the foreign corporation. As Part II explains, the use of “for-
eign” affiliates of U.S. companies enables income-shifting techniques, 
primarily with the use of intercompany transactions. Unsurprisingly, 
such transactions are structured so as to have the income accumulating 
with the “foreign” entity while the deductible payments—for the most 
part—are made by the U.S. entity. 
 To combat this type of tax planning, some scholars and policymak-
ers have suggested that the U.S. adopt a “managed and controlled test” 
for determining corporate tax residence.151 Avi-Yonah has suggested 
that a “managed and controlled” test would deter corporate inversions 
because they would require corporations to be actually run from 
abroad in order to avoid being labeled as a U.S. corporation.152, More-
over, Senator Carl Levin introduced the “Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act,” 
under which a public corporation (and other entities meeting specific 
thresholds) managed and controlled within the United States would be 
treated as a domestic corporation.153 
 Proponents of such central management and control (“CMC”) 
tests evidently support the tests because they view them as effective 
tools to combat tax avoidance. Such a justification is implicitly a norma-
tive argument that derives its vitality from nexus theories. If one be-
lieves that a “foreign” entity must be taxed in the United States on a 
worldwide basis in spite of its foreign status, it is because such an entity 
                                                                                                                      
151 Tax Reform Options, supra note 32, at 29–37 (statement of Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Pro-
fessor, University of Michigan Law School). 
152 Id. at 34–35. Other commentators embrace this view as well. See, e.g., McIntyre, su-
pra note 5, at 1571–72 (discussing the development of meaningful legal standards for cor-
porate residence); International Tax Reform, supra note 2, at 748. The U.S. has incorporated 
the concept of place of central management and control into most of its bilateral tax trea-
ties. This concept is therefore not foreign to federal income tax law, and can be easily 
transported into the U.S. tax code. See United States Model Income Tax Convention, 
art. 22, § 5(d) (2006). Article 22 defines a company’s “primary place of management and 
control.” See id. Article 4 explicitly recognizes a company’s place of management as a de-
terminant of tax residence. See id art. 4, § 1. 
153 Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, S. 1346, 112th Cong. § 103 (2011). Under the Act, a 
publicly traded corporation managed “directly or indirectly, primarily within the United 
States . . . shall be treated as a domestic corporation.” Id. Additional bills suggest similar 
reforms in corporate tax residence determinations like the Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act. See, 
e.g., Cut Unjustified Tax Loopholes Act, S. 268, 113th Cong. § 103 (2013); Cut Unjustified 
Tax Loopholes Act, S. 2075, 113th Cong. § 103 (2012); International Tax Competitiveness 
Act of 2011, H.R. 62, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011). 
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must display some “meaningful connection” to the U.S. that somehow 
justifies the entity’s taxation.154 
 Some commentators, however, fiercely object to the CMC tests and 
instead support the retention of the POI model. They believe that the 
introduction of a CMC test into the federal income tax system would 
“effectively [transform] a portion of the corporate tax from a tax on 
the return to business assets into a tax on active management and con-
trol.”155 Such a shift in tax policy may cause corporate taxpayers to shift 
their active managements overseas, thereby resulting in the loss (in the 
U.S.) of the positive externalities associated with having corporate 
headquarters physically located in the United States.156 In addition, the 
commentators correctly argue that the POI test is also much easier to 
administer than the CMC test, thereby saving administrative costs.157 
Both of these arguments clearly rely on an efficiency rationale.158 
 The debate between the POI and CMC tests in the context of U.S. 
tax reform is completely disconnected from the parallel discourse 
about the policy purposes underlying the U.S.’s taxation on corpora-
tions. It is a normative debate about how the U.S. should determine the 
residence of corporations, independent of any other corporate tax con-
structs. Evidently, justifications for one model or the other travel along 
a normative spectrum between efficiency (in the case of POI) or nexus 
(in the case of CMC). As Part I argues, the confinement of corporate 
tax residence debate to this normative spectrum is the very reason for 
the creation of meaningless corporate tax residence concepts. 
B. The POI Test Does Not Support the Purposes of Corporate Taxation  
in the United States 
 This Section takes a functional view of corporate tax residence in 
the United States to demonstrate the fresh insights such a view pro-
duces for prospective tax reform. The U.S. is one of the only countries 
in the world to adopt POI as its only determinative corporate tax resi-
                                                                                                                      
154 See International Tax Reform, supra note 2, at 748 (stating that “[t]he definition of a 
domestic corporation should efficiently encompass the factors that create a connection be-
tween the corporation and the United States that justifies residence-based corporate taxation 
as opposed to a mere source-based taxation”). 
155 Tax Reform Options, supra note 32, at 47 (statement of James R. Hines, Jr., Professor, 
University of Michigan Law School). 
156 See id. 
157 See id. at 47–48. 
158 See id. In his testimony, Professor James Hines explicitly based his recommendations 
on the principle of efficiency. Id. at 51. 
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dence test.159 As mentioned above, most other countries that utilize 
POI tests also adopt alternative residence tests. Taking a functional ap-
proach, this Section explains why the POI test does not support con-
temporary policy purposes of corporate taxation in the United States. 
1. The POI Test Does Not Effectuate the Incorporation-Benefits 
Theory of Corporate Taxation 
 Although the uniqueness of the U.S.’s corporate tax residence law 
could be a reflection of a clear political choice to tax the benefits of 
incorporation, this cannot possibly be the case. As an initial matter, it is 
doubtful that the benefits granted by an act of incorporation in the 
United States can normatively support subjecting a corporation to 
worldwide taxation in the United States. Michael S. Kirsch has thor-
oughly researched the issue160 and concluded that the normative justi-
fications for a POI test are “somewhat tenuous.”161 
 More importantly, however, under current U.S. law, one could 
achieve the full spectrum of the benefits of incorporation with little or 
no corporate tax consequences. This is because corporate taxation in 
the United States is, for the most part, an explicitly elective regime. Spe-
cifically, under the “check the box” regulations,162 only certain entities 
organized under U.S. laws are treated as corporations for federal in-
come tax purposes. Other forms of business entities, most notably lim-
ited liability companies, S-corporations, and partnerships, are treated as 
“transparent” for federal income tax purposes, even though they pro-
vide limited liability, centralized management, and other benefits of 
incorporation to their members. Furthermore, a 2007 report by the 
Congressional Research Service (“CRS”) notes that “liberal rules . . . 
allow firms to obtain benefits of corporate status (such as limited liabil-
ity) while still being taxed as unincorporated businesses . . . .”163 The 
CRS report also notes a significant rise in the share of total U.S. busi-
ness income received by unincorporated businesses since 1980.164 
                                                                                                                      
159 Few other countries use POI as the sole test of corporate tax residence. These in-
clude, for example, Russia. See Tax Mgmt. (BNA) Portfolio 7330-1st: Business Operations in 
Russia, pt. VI, § A (describing Russia, where a domestic corporation is a corporation organ-
ized under Russian law). 
160 Kirsch, supra note 110, at 551–75. 
161 Id. at 575. 
162 26 C.F.R. §§ 301.7701-1 to -3 (2013). 
163 Gravelle & Hungerford, supra note 90, at 4. 
164 Id. (noting an increase of the share of total U.S. business income received by unin-
corporated businesses from twenty-one percent in 1980 to sixty percent in 2007). 
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Among Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(“OECD”) countries, the U.S. has one of the largest unincorporated 
business sectors, second only to Mexico.165 
 To summarize, even if the benefits-of-incorporation explanation 
for corporate taxation has theoretical appeal, which is highly dis-
puted,166 it probably makes little sense to argue that the current pur-
pose of corporate taxes in the United States is to tax the benefits of in-
corporation. Under the “check the box” regulations, the U.S. is 
explicitly willing to grant such benefits without charging anything for 
them. The only meaningful exception is publicly traded entities, which 
are treated as per se corporations, and are not entitled to elect out of 
the corporate tax regime.167 Thus, one can conclude that the POI test 
is not tasked effectively with  taxing the benefits of incorporation. 
                                                                                                                     
 One could argue, however, for POI as a tax residence test if it is 
context-sensitive, thereby supporting other reasons why the U.S. taxes 
corporations. But when considering the specific context of the U.S., this 
argument too cannot stand. To understand why, a brief survey of the 
possible reason for taxing corporations in the United States is war-
ranted. According to U.S. scholars, there are at least four possible justifi-
cations (other than the benefits of incorporation) explaining the impo-
sition of corporate taxes in the United States. They are discussed below. 
2. The POI Test Does Not Effectively Regulate U.S. Managers 
 According to one theory explaining the emergence of corporate 
taxation in the United States, corporate tax as a real entity measure was 
first enacted in 1909, primarily as a regulatory device.168 The tax re-
flected negative sentiment in Congress towards large-scale business en-
tities that accumulated substantial power towards the end of the nine-
 
165 See Small Businesses and Tax Reform: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue 
Measures, 112th Cong. 8–17 (2011) (testimony of Robert Carroll, Principal, Ernst & Young 
LLP). 
166 See supra note 56 and accompanying text. One scholar has concluded that “ad-
vances in the theory of corporate personality appear to have had only a modest influence, 
if any, on the taxation of the corporation . . . .” Bank, Entity Theory as Myth, supra note 42, at 
466. 
167 If publically traded entities are incorporated, they are treated as per se corporations 
subject to corporate taxation. 26 C.F.R. § 301.7701-2. If the publically traded entity is not 
incorporated, however, it will be treated as partnership for federal income tax purposes. 
Nevertheless, a special I.R.C. provision makes such entities subject to corporate taxation. 
See I.R.C. § 7704 (2006). 
168 Avi-Yonah, Corporations, Society, and the State, supra note 38, at 1225; Avi-Yonah, supra 
note 42, at 377; Kornhauser, supra note 138, at 53. 
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teenth century.169 Influential corporate managements were identified 
as a source of abuse of power.170 It had therefore been suggested that 
“the imposition of the corporate tax will enable the government, the 
shareholders, and the public to obtain information that will serve as 
the basis for restricting such managerial abuses of power.”171 In this way, 
the 1909 Act was an attempt to restrict managerial power.172 
 Anecdotal evidence suggests that historically, U.S. managers have 
primarily managed U.S.-incorporated corporations.173 Thus, the POI 
test may have actually functioned successfully to capture those U.S. 
managers that were the legislature’s true target. Yet if this policy pur-
pose of regulating managers remains relevant today,174 there is little 
reason to believe it can still be supported by the POI test. Today, U.S. 
managers and entrepreneurs “elect out” of having their income-
generating corporations incorporated in the United States,175 and, as a 
                                                                                                                      
169 Bank, Entity Theory as Myth, supra note 42, at 508–11; Ajay K. Mehrotra, The Public 
Control of Corporate Power: Revisiting the 1909 U.S. Corporate Tax from a Comparative Perspective, 
11 Theoretical Inquiries L. 497, 510 (2010). 
170 Avi-Yonah, supra note 38, at 1220 (citing Letter from William Howard Taft to Hor-
ace Taft ( June 27, 1909)). 
171 Avi-Yonah, supra note 42, at 383. 
172 Id. at 382–87. 
173 While a historical survey is beyond the scope of this Article, congressional tax writ-
ing committees often recognized the individuals targeted by the enactment of corporate 
taxes by name. See Steven S. Weisman, The Great Tax Wars: Lincoln to Wilson—The 
Fierce Battles over Money and Power that Transformed the Nation 124, 219 
(2002) (describing the status of corporations within the context of the 1909 Act and quot-
ing Representative Cordell Hull as complaining about the “‘infamous system of class legis-
lation’ that burdened an average person while ‘virtually exempting the Carnegies, the 
Vanderbilts, the Morgans, and the Rockefellers, with their aggregated billions of hoarded 
wealth”). Beyond the family names mentioned by Representative Hull, Congress also at-
tempted to target famous names such as Astor, Gould, and Havemeyer, See id. at 137, 144. 
These “named” individuals were understood to be the true aim of original corporate tax 
laws in the United States; the individuals generally owned and managed U.S. incorporated 
corporations, and the POI test therefore acted to capture the intended individuals. For 
example, Standard Oil was incorporated by John Davison D. Rockefeller in 1870 in Ohio. 
See 7 Dictionary of American History 520–21 (Stanley I. Kutler ed., 2003). The Van-
derbilt’s railroad empire was composed of several state-chartered corporations, including 
some corporations in New York. See Erie Ry. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 88 U.S. 492, 493 (1874) 
(stating that the Erie Railway Company, of which the Vanderbilt family had controlling 
stake, “was chartered by an act of the legislature of the State of New York, April 24th, 
1832”). Finally, the Astors’ fur trading empire was operated under the American Fur Com-
pany, which was incorporated in New York in 1808. See An Act to Incorporate the American 
Fur Company, 1808 N.Y. Sess. Laws 160 (McKinney). 
174 Avi-Yonah, supra note 38, at 1231–50 (arguing that the policy purpose of regulating 
managers is still relevant today). 
175 See infra note 176 and accompanying text (noting that most U.S. owned corpora-
tions that accumulate profits are foreign entities). 
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result, such individuals are no longer captured by the POI test. To be 
exact, although there is no statistical evidence that U.S. individuals tend 
to prefer offshore incorporation,176 there is ample evidence that U.S.-
incorporated corporations accumulate their profits not directly, but in 
subsidiaries incorporated in offshore tax havens.177 
3. The POI Test Does Not Effectively Tax U.S. Shareholders 
 Another theory explaining the inception of corporate tax in the 
United States provides that corporate income tax was originally in-
tended to be a proxy for directly taxing shareholders.178 According to 
this theory, the 1909 Act was simply part of a continuous attempt to 
tax shareholders’ wealth accumulated by doing business in corporate 
form.179 
 For the same reasons that the POI test fails to capture U.S. manag-
ers, it also fails to capture U.S. shareholders. In the current global envi-
ronment there is no reason for a U.S. shareholder to accumulate earn-
ings in corporations incorporated in the United States. As explained in 
Subsection 2, earnings are regularly accumulated in corporations in-
corporated in foreign jurisdictions. 
4. The POI Test Does Not Ameliorate Agency Problems  
in U.S. Public Markets 
 Another policy of corporate taxation, suggested by several com-
mentators, is that corporate taxation is justified as a means to reduce 
agency costs arising out of nonalignment of interests between managers 
and shareholders of publicly traded corporations in the United 
States.180 Under this theory, “corporate tax is interpreted as a substitute 
for contractual constraints on the agents of a firm.”181 In the absence of 
a corporate-level tax, corporate managers who also hold equity in the 
corporation is likely to prefer their own tax interests when making cor-
porate-level decisions that affect the tax consequences of shareholders. 
                                                                                                                      
176 Eric J. Allen & Susan C. Morse, Tax Haven Incorporation for U.S. Headquartered Firms: 
No Exodus Yet, 66 Nat’l Tax J. (forthcoming 2013). 
177 Donald J. Marples & Jane G. Gravelle, Congressional Research Serv., Tax 
Cuts on Repatriation Earnings as Economic Stimulus: An Economic Analysis 1–2 
(2011); see also Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, Repatriating Offshore 
Funds: 2004 Windfall for Select Multinationals 2–6 (2011). 
178 Bank, Entity Theory as Myth, supra note 42, at 452. 
179 Bank, US Corporate Excise Tax of 1909, supra note 42, at 395. 
180 Kanda & Levmore, supra note 130, at 226–34. 
181 Id. at 213. 
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Once a tax is imposed at the entity level, it creates an alignment of in-
terests; both managers and shareholders have interest in reducing en-
tity-level tax, regardless of their individual tax interests.182 
                                                                                                                     
 The POI test does not support such a purpose. There is no re-
quirement that an entity that is publicly traded in a U.S. exchange will 
also be incorporated in the United States. Foreign-incorporated corpo-
rations—which may or may not be subject to corporate-level tax in the 
foreign jurisdiction, and that are listed for trade in United States—are 
not subject to the full reach of U.S. corporate tax jurisdiction. Agency 
costs are not necessarily alleviated in such corporations. 
5. The POI Test Does Not Function to Tax Access to U.S.  
Public Markets 
 Another theory suggests that corporate tax is imposed as a fee for 
access to U.S. public markets.183 According to this theory, liquidity pro-
vides non-controlling shareholders with a significant benefit, and cor-
porate tax can be justified as a cost on this liquidity.184 Even still, the 
POI test does not function to support such a purpose given that for-
eign-incorporated corporations can freely list their securities on U.S. 
exchanges. 
C. The U.S. Should Adopt a Place of Listing or CMC Test 
 Given that the POI test does not function to support any of the 
possible purposes of corporate taxation in the United States, the ques-
tion remains whether any test can. This Section assumes that all justifi-
cations for taxing corporations in the United States are equally plausi-
ble, and tries to incorporate them all into a suggested legal construct. 
 Below are the four possible purposes for taxing corporations in the 
United States, as well as the corresponding functional test for each: 
1. Taxation of shareholders—ownership test; 
2. Regulation of managers—place of management and control 
test; 
3. Reducing agency costs—place of listing test; 
4. Fee to access liquid capital—place of listing test. 
 
182 Id. at 229–33. 
183 Rudnick, supra note 132, at 1092–93 
184 Id. at 1099–1103. 
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 The first obvious conclusion is that any test other than POI, at the 
very least, achieves one or more purposes for which the U.S. imposes 
corporate tax. The easy conclusion is that the U.S. could adopt what 
Part III describes above as an over-inclusive response.185 Namely, the 
U.S. could adopt a three-pronged residence test under which any cor-
poration that is (1) majority-owned by U.S. residents, (2) managed and 
controlled from within the United States, or (3) the securities of which 
are listed on a U.S. exchange, will be classified as “domestic” for federal 
income tax purposes. 
 A contextual response, however,186 might prove workable given the 
unique circumstances of the United States. Significantly, publicly traded 
U.S. corporations are overwhelmingly owned by U.S. residents.187 
Whether we adopt place of listing test, or a place of shareholders resi-
dence test, we would largely capture the same corporations under the 
definition. Under such circumstances, the place of listing test will cap-
ture the U.S. shareholders we presumably seek to tax. Accordingly, there 
is no need to adopt an ownership test in the current environment. 
 Of course, “domestic” publicly traded corporations may themselves 
hold non-publicly traded entities, and channel funds through such en-
tities, thereby avoiding current worldwide taxation. Thus, entities con-
trolled by corporations, the securities of which are listed on a U.S. ex-
change, should also be regarded as domestic for tax purposes. 
 The issue is more elaborate in the context of regulating managers. 
To the extent we are only worried about managers of publicly traded 
entities accumulating excessive power, the place of listing test would 
also work. With a lack of measurable data regarding power accumula-
tion in private versus public entities, however, the CMC test is also 
needed. For example, in the absence of such a rule, a domestically 
listed entity could exert its “excessive power” through the use of a non-
listed affiliated entity. It is therefore necessary to ensure that corpora-
tions within an affiliated group, in which a member is publicly traded 
in the United States, are treated as U.S. tax residents to achieve this 
regulatory aim.188 
                                                                                                                      
 
185 See supra notes 135-136 and accompanying text. 
186 See id. 
187 See supra notes 91–97 and accompanying text. 
188 For this reason, the “Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act” may fail the functional test, as it 
requires a corporation to be publicly traded as a necessary condition to qualify as “domes-
tic,” or to meet the $50,000,000 threshold of assets under management. See Stop Tax Ha-
ven Abuse Act, S. 1346, 112th Cong. § 103 (2011). Under such circumstances, publicly 
traded corporations will not change their behavior and no abuse will be prevented: pub-
licly traded corporations will simply accumulate their income in offshore private subsidiar-
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 The bottom line recommendation of this Article is for the U.S. to 
adopt a test under which a corporation that is (i) managed and con-
trolled from the United States; or (ii) the securities of which are listed 
on an exchange in the United States (or a corporation controlled by a 
corporation, the securities of which are listed on an exchange in the 
United States), will be treated as a “domestic” corporation for federal 
income tax purposes. 
 Once again, it is crucial to note that in suggesting this model this 
Article assumes that all contemporary justifications for taxing corpora-
tions in the United States are equally plausible. The suggested model 
does not offer one approach that holds an inherent normative value, 
and to the extent one prefers certain policy purposes of corporate taxa-
tion over others, the implication would probably be to adopt a different 
corporate tax residence model. 
Conclusion 
 Most countries determine the “domestic” or “foreign” tax status of 
corporate entities by applying one of two kinds of tests (or a combina-
tion thereof): the formal place of incorporation (“POI”) test, or the 
substantive place of real seat (“RS”) test. This Article demonstrates that 
for tax purposes, the rationalization for the adoption of one test or the 
other is driven by this apparent dichotomy, and is for the most part 
normative. Proponents of the POI test tend to emphasize efficiency, 
while RS supporters tend to highlight theories of nexus. 
 This dichotomy, however, provides little guidance in designing a 
workable corporate tax residence model. The dichotomy does not fit 
within the framework of theories justifying corporate taxation. Norma-
tive justifications for the POI and RS tests contain implicit assumptions 
that have been rejected by both tax law theorists and public finance 
empiricists. 
 As a remedy, this Article develops the first cohesive functional ap-
proach to corporate tax residence. The functional approach operates 
to support the policy purposes for which countries impose corporate 
income taxes. Because it is purpose-driven, the functional approach 
does not lend itself to the substantive/formal dichotomy. 
 The approach that this Article developed is not exhaustive, in the 
sense that it cannot possibly consider all possible purposes for which 
different countries choose to tax corporations. But its strength is in its 
                                                                                                                      
ies, ensuring that each subsidiary holds no more than $50,000,000 of assets under man-
agement. See id. 
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flexibility to consider new purposes and interactions of various pur-
poses in the specific contexts of each jurisdiction. As such, a functional 
approach can provide guidance even with respect to purposes of cor-
porate taxation not explicitly considered herein. 
 In addition, this Article argues that a functional view of corporate 
tax residence strongly suggests that the United States should reform the 
way it defines “domestic” and “foreign” corporations for federal income 
tax purposes. This Article considers the special circumstances in the 
United States—a world financial center, but also a place where corpora-
tions are overwhelmingly owned by domestic residents. Under such 
circumstances, and given the most prevalent policy purposes for which 
the U.S. seeks to tax corporations, the correct test to adopt is a double-
pronged test of the place of listing, or the place of central management 
and control. 
 This Article stresses one final note. Comparative inquires suggest 
that different jurisdictions may tax corporations for different reasons. 
Therefore, corporate tax-residence tests should also be different among 
jurisdictions. There is no “perfect residence test” —there are only “per-
fect residence tests.” Inevitably then, corporate tax residence tests are 
locally and politically oriented, and the “best test” discussion should be 
abandoned. 
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